UNIVERSAL MILITARY SERVICE: A STUDY OF ITS ROLE IN SUPPORTING THE REQUIREMENTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY

JOHN W. DRURY

THESIS
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UNIVERSAL MILITARY SERVICE:
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JOHN WILLIAM DRURY, B.Sc.
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"It may be laid down as a primary position, and the basis of our system that every Citizen who enjoys the protection of free Government, owes not only a proportion of his property, but even of his personal services to the defense of it."

General George Washington

"It may be laid down as a primary
principle, that the basis of our systems
must rely in the first place on the pre-
ference of their interests, and not
only a jurisdiction or its property, but
what of its personal services to the
defence of it."

CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM

Because the United States is a nation dedicated to peace, it is faced with a particularly complex problem when it attempts to provide for military preparedness. A nation with aggressive ambitions can plan and prepare in advance for a definite campaign and type of warfare. Such a nation can determine when and where it will attack. An aggressor nation need not declare war, and in the future, it almost certainly will not make such a declaration.

A peace-loving nation must prepare for all types of attacks which might conceivably be launched against it. It can leave no avenue unguarded. The United States, shunning aggression, stands as a primary target for future aggression. Two world wars have shown that the United States is the nation to be defeated if aggression is to succeed. So far, the aggressors have failed. However, the United States, being a prime target for any new aggressor, must consider the possible nature of future warfare and make preparations comprehensive enough to meet all types of attack.

I. NATURE OF FUTURE WARFARE

In reaching a state of preparedness, the first necessity is to envisage the possible nature of future attacks. Modern developments in methods of warfare require new concepts of

defense.

First, the great advances made in aviation during World War II, and subsequent developments of long-range aircraft, now make it possible for an air attack to be launched across ocean frontiers or the polar ice cap. The likelihood of such attacks, in great intensity and suddenness, will increase sharply with future developments of aircraft capable of flying at supersonic speeds and at such altitudes that anti-aircraft fire would be powerless to stop them. In the field of guided missiles, there are still large areas for exploration and development. The V-1 and V-2 rockets used against London in World War II were highly effective because of the large target and the short range. Similar weapons of greater range and accuracy have undoubtedly been developed but when it comes to trans-oceanic ranges, it is doubtful if a weapon of this type could be produced and used in the immediate future. However, such weapons might be used effectively if launched from planes, submarines, or surface craft, a technique which could be developed easily in the immediate future.

Second, the development of immensely more powerful weapons of mass destruction utilizing the forces provided by the release of atomic energy was demonstrated by the devastating effects of the A-Bomb in World War II. The type of bomb dropped on Hiroshima was equivalent in destructive power to two hundred B-29 loads of conventional bombs delivered on the target area.

Future atomic bombs undoubtedly will be even more destructive. In addition, chemical and bacteriological weapons of great destructiveness have been developed, providing a relatively inexpensive means of waging a large scale war. That such warfare has not been waged in the past is no assurance that future wars will not be characterized by such attacks.

Third, overt acts of future wars will in all probability begin with a sneak attack of the type delivered on Pearl Harbor. The increased range of aircraft and the great destructive power of atomic weapons make such attacks vastly more probable than in the past.

Fourth, the speed and force with which future attacks upon the United States might be made, make it imperative that a counterattacking force be maintained in a constant state of readiness. Such a force would be necessary to retaliate instantly with our most effective weapons. In future wars, it will be unlikely that the nation will have months of relative immunity after the outbreak of war to mobilize, train, and equip an effective force. Our preparation must be such that we can stand alone if necessary from the very beginning of the attack -- and win.

Fifth, all forms of warfare have progressed to more highly mechanized states, with a steady decrease in the number of troops actually fighting in close combat at the front. At the same time, there has been a great increase in the number of men

in rear areas as technicians and supply components.

Sixth, the nature of future wars is such that for the first time since the Civil War, it is likely that war will be carried to the home front, with every city, factory, and farm becoming part of the possible combat area. The entire population not only must engage actively in the conduct of the war but it also must be subject to personal attack by the enemy.

Seventh, subversive activities will surely become more important in the plans of an aggressor nation than they did in World War II. The enemy would seek to undermine the confidence of the people in the government, to spread defeatism, to promote disunity, and to commit sabotage.

Without a doubt, these characteristics will be present in any future war in which the United States becomes involved. However much we may desire to avoid such involvement, we must consider possible ways in which the United States may become involved in war with a hostile nation. Basically, there are four ways in which hostile enemy action might involve the United States in war.

First, the United States might be attacked directly by a powerful enemy or combination of enemies. It is unlikely that this type of attack will occur until such time as an aggressor has achieved quantity production of atomic bombs or other means of mass destruction. Such an attack might be preceded by a period in which subversive agents would attempt to weaken the

country through acts of sabotage and by causing disunity wherever possible. With the actual attack, the enemy would hope to immobilize the country militarily, industrially, and politically through the force of his initial assault and fifth column activities. Such an attack would aim not only at destroying our means of striking back with retaliating blows, but also at creating panic and demoralization among the civilian population.

A second way in which this country might become involved in war would result from the aggressive tactics of some nation against its neighbor, an action which could not be countenanced by the United States and the United Nations because of ultimate threats to world security or because the rights and liberties of others were threatened. Such aggression would start with political infiltration, to be followed by military and political domination if allowed to proceed unchecked. The aggressor would hope to increase his own resources and to improve his geographical position for inflicting decisive blows against this country. The actual attack against this country would wait until the enemy had the atomic bomb or comparable weapons.

A third type of war might start with the attempt of a powerful European or Asiatic nation to gain a foothold in Latin America. The invasion of any American nation should provoke prompt military action on our part, but invasion by an enemy need not be physical. Consideration must also be given to defense against political invasion. Defense against such

tactics lies in the strengthening of the forces of democracy throughout the world by the extension of economic aid and by the vigor of our own example and conduct.

A final type of warfare might require the policing action against a small nation whose conduct menaces world peace and security. This is the type of function envisaged as the duty of the proposed international police force under the United Nations. However, this country might be required to take such action alone if a threatening incident arose before the creation of the international police force. It is this type of police function in which the United States is engaged at present in Korea, a function which would eventually be handled by a United Nations police force created for that purpose.

These possibilities of future war cannot be ignored so long as they represent conceivable threats to our peace and security. As long as such dangers exist, it is imperative that this country prepare to meet them. A program of national security must be developed which will permit this country to meet future acts of aggression which threaten it. The essentials of an integrated national security program have several basic requirements.

II. ESSENTIALS OF A NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM

The most important essential of a national security program would be a strong, united nation. The United States must cooperate with the free nations of the world towards peace,

reconstruction, and productivity. In particular, a healthy economy is needed, one characterized by full production, full employment, and the avoidance of recurring economic crises. A high general level of education is needed throughout the country, with advance schooling available to all who can qualify for it without regard to economic status, but based on merit. This is necessary to provide leadership for technical and specialist fields, to provide for an informed public, and to promote understanding among the citizens of their responsibility to their country. Also needed is improved health and physical well-being for the general population in order that the full potential manpower resources of the country may be available in time of emergency. Finally, every individual must be made to understand democracy, to substitute cooperation for conflict, and to eliminate all forms of intolerance. This requirement of a healthy, educated population need not be undertaken as part of a military program since such resources are just as essential in peace as in war. It more properly belongs within the realm of civilian agencies of Federal, State, and local governments, and beyond that, in the realm of churches, schools, and industries.

A second essential of a national security program is a coordinated intelligence service. Knowledge of what is happening in the rest of the world is essential for the security of this country. Such information must include developments in

international diplomacy, in science, in industry, and in politics. Such information must be carefully collected and analyzed to provide a "cushion of time", a cushion which has been greatly shortened with the development of high speed aircraft and the atomic bomb. Information of contemplated enemy aggression against the United States must be received in sufficient time to permit alerting of defenses and the preparation of forces capable of retaliation. Also, modern development of fifth column activity requires the development of an effective counterespionage service which can reduce the threat of espionage, sabotage, and subversion within the population while preserving the rights of the individual. Finally, an intelligence program should include the means of providing the rest of the world with truthful reports about the world situation and our part in it.

Third, a defense program must carry on scientific research and development. World War II demonstrated the effectiveness of scientific research and development in providing new weapons of war and defense. Such developments are not necessarily restricted to warfare. Great advances have been made in the field of medicine and in aviation. It is important that continued interest in and support of basic and applied research on the part of the armed forces be extended to the field of pure research rather than to neglect this field in order to exploit discoveries previously made.

Fourth, a program for national security must include industrial mobilization and stock piling of critical and essential materials. Time is important; industrial readiness must parallel scientific progress. Modern weapons must be in the hands of the fighting forces when the enemy strikes, therefore our preparedness must be for the first few crucial hours of attack. Obsolete weapons may have to be discarded without ever having been used in favor of newer and better equipment. Industrial mobilization should be in the hands of competent civilians, and encouragement should be given to the dispersal of strategic industrial plants to prevent the destruction of an entire industry in an initial phase of attack. Critical facilities should be located underground, and government agencies should be decentralized. Duplicate facilities should be set up for key networks of communication and transportation. Stock piles of critical materials must be built up to replace those which might be lost and in quantities which would prevent disaster if sources abroad were closed to us. In addition to peacetime planning, there must be plans for immediate conversion of industry to war production in the event of attack. Such plans must be kept flexible to meet changing needs and concepts of warfare.

Fifth, an adequate defense program must consider the Armed forces themselves. The first and most important requirement is a mobile striking force. Such a force would rely heavily on

air power to stop the enemy's attack and to retaliate with all possible force. Such a force would necessarily consist of highly trained professional soldiers and airmen and the service and supply troops needed to maintain them. Its function would be both offensive and defensive. This would be our first line of defense, and its first duty would be to launch the most destructive attack possible against the enemy's centers which were of importance in waging war.

In addition to immediate retaliation, our armed forces would have to undertake an immediate campaign to secure strategic bases which might be located anywhere in the world. Where possible, such bases should be secured by diplomatic means, but if this is impossible, their capture and maintenance would be the function of our second line of defense -- the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. Equipment to support these operations might be flown in at first, but in prolonged operations involving large numbers of men and equipment, the Navy or Merchant Marine would have the primary responsibility for replacements and supplies.

In addition to carrying supplies and protecting troop and supply shipping, the Navy would carry on offensive operations. War vessels might serve as means of launching atomic counter-attacks against the enemy's homeland or outposts. They would seek to eliminate the enemy's seapower and cut his ocean supply lines. They could participate in amphibious operations in

both the actual assault and in supporting such operations afterwards. Since the enemy would take the initiative at the outset by his choice of the time and mode of attack, he would have a headstart in the acquisition of bases from which he could further his attack and defend his own forces from retaliation.

This first struggle for bases might involve heavy fighting and heavy casualties immediately upon commencement of hostilities. Not only would a large number of men be needed from the first in carrying out retaliating blows and as replacements for heavy initial casualties, but consideration must be given to troops needed as occupation forces in Japan and Germany. Not only would it be dangerous to remove such forces from the occupied countries but the very nature of their duty, training, and equipment would not permit them to render effective service as part of the initial striking force.

Under present circumstances, a large part of the standing Army would be excluded from repelling an attack upon the United States. Not only must there be personnel to carry through with the initial defense measures, to initiate offensive action against an enemy, and to maintain occupation forces, but there must be personnel available to carry forward the mobilization of the reserve units of all the services, to preserve order, and to restore vital services which would undoubtedly be destroyed by an enemy's initial attack. Finally, personnel would

be needed to combat sabotage and espionage, and to perform other home defense responsibilities. All of these requirements call for the services of a large number of people, a number which might even be greater than the millions required in World War II. In future wars, not a single area in the United States could avoid being subject to attack without warning under conditions almost certain to provoke widespread casualties, panic, and demoralization.

III. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

To meet such a universal attack, trained men must be readily available everywhere. The purpose of this thesis is to propose one means of providing this large number of trained men which would be required in the event of another World War involving the United States. This thesis will show that a system of universal military service would provide the necessary men to guarantee an adequate armed forces to meet an enemy attack and to provide a steady flow of men to carry the attack to the enemy if large-scale fighting for bases or an invasion of the enemy homeland was needed. Equally important, universal military service would provide the trained men needed to cope with the unprecedented problems of internal security which atomic warfare would bring.

Universal military service must be integrated into the national defense program as a part of a balanced structure. The relation of universal military service to such a program

was best described by Mr. Bernard M. Baruch when he stated before the President's Advisory Commission on Universal Training in 1947 that universal military service

> must be regarded as the apex of a pyramid grounded upon the broad bases of industrial preparedness, military intelligence, information, and all the other elements that are essential. To believe that our national security can be assured through universal training alone is to deceive ourselves and to waste precious training time of our youth. Only if it is combined with a sound and comprehensive program for our national security can it be really effective.[1]

The purpose of this thesis, then, is to determine the role of universal military service in supporting the requirements of national security. The problem will be approached first by analyzing the actual personnel needs of the United States for the immediate future, and then comparing these needs with the personnel now available to determine the discrepancies in our present program. Second, by a survey of experience with universal military service to determine its effectiveness in supplying large numbers of trained people when needed in foreign countries, and a study of the numerous attempts to institute such a program in this country.

The systems in two foreign countries today will be used for examples and a program will be proposed for use in the United States. The proposed program will be discussed from various aspects and compared with other means of securing

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[1] A Program for National Security, President's Advisory Commission on Universal Training (Washington: 1947), p. 30.

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The purpose of this thesis, then, is to determine the role of universal military service in supporting the requirements of national security. The problem will be approached first by analyzing the actual personnel needs of the United States for the foreseeable future, and then comparing those needs with the personnel that evaluate or determine the disappearance in our present program. Second, by a survey of experience with universal military service by determine its effectiveness in supplying large numbers of trained people from nations in foreign countries, and a study of the numerous attempts to institute such a program in this country.

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[1] A Program for National Security, President's Advisory Commission on Universal Training (Washington 1947), p. [illegible].

large numbers of men for military purposes. Finally, conclusions will be drawn and recommendations made as to the role of universal military service in a program of national security.

CHAPTER II

ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM

Faced with an urgent problem of military preparedness, the United States must immediately raise the manpower necessary to build and maintain an armed force of a size determined to be our minimum security requirement, and to provide for the maintenance of an adequate force of trained reserves for the future security of the United States.

In this chapter, the general requirements of personnel needs for defense will be considered, and an estimate of personnel needs for the immediate future will be made. The proposed increase in the size of the armed forces will be analyzed from the standpoint of the men immediately needed to build the armed forces up to that size and from the standpoint of the men needed to maintain them at that size. These needs will be considered and compared with the sources of manpower now available. Future sources of manpower will be considered, and finally, a proposal for bringing the armed forces up to the required strength and for maintaining them at that point will be advanced.

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Since 1939, the expansion of international communism has proceeded at an increasingly rapid rate. In that brief span of eleven years, the Soviet Union proper has made twelve

THE CRISIS OF THE SUMMER

Events began to undergo further an alarming acceleration. The Italian Ambassador was instructed immediately upon his reinstatement to inform Lord Halifax that Mussolini was ready to initiate such mediation as should lead to a plan basing Italy's claims upon reasonably satisfactory guarantees, but to insist that the Italian demands should be put forward immediately. Lord Halifax replied that the British Government was ready to enter into conversations at once, but that it could not be expected to withdraw its guarantee to Poland. Italian mediation might be considered only when the question of evacuation of occupied territory had been settled. Hitler's reaction to the British attitude was to order the immediate mobilization of his armies. He declared that he would not be responsible for the consequences if Great Britain should persist in her opposition. The British Government replied that it was ready to enter into negotiations with Germany

territorial acquisitions totaling over three hundred thousand square miles and bringing more than 35,000,000 people under Communist domination.[1] Within the last year, North Korean Communists have invaded South Korea and thereby precipitated a struggle into which an unprepared America has committed nearly all of its available combat troops.

> The grim fact is that the United States is now engaged in a struggle for survival. The dimensions of that struggle cannot be measured. We do not know how long it will continue; we do not know how or where a decision will be ultimately reached; we do not know what is required of us. Of these things we can be sure: Our strength is not adequate for the present, nor has our strength, in past years, been adequate at the moment of initial need. With this knowledge, it behooves a responsible Nation to meet immediately the clear necessities of the present and to prepare for the future by correcting the acknowledged errors of past experience.[2]

On 30 June 1950, there were, in the continental United

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[1]Harry Hansen, ed., The World Almanac and Book of Facts (New York: New York World Telegram, 1951), pp. 500-1. Territorial acquisitions of the Soviet Union since 1939:

Poland
Latvia
Lithuania
Estonia
Karelo-Finland
Turvinian Peoples Republic of Outer Mongolia
Ruthenia
Moldavia
Bessarabia
East Prussia
Kurile Islands
Sakhalin Island

[2]Universal Military Training and Service Act, Report on S. 1, U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 82nd Cong., 1st sess. (Washington: 1951), p. 2.

States and on occupational duty in Germany and Japan, only twelve divisions.[3] All twelve of these divisions were under strength. Only three, the 82nd Airborne, and the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions were well-equipped and well-trained.[4] This should be testimony to the inadequacy of our strength. No nation aspiring to preserve its security or to protect its freedoms can long sustain such a clearly critical deficit in its strength.

To avoid increasing our national jeopardy, it is imperative that steps now be taken to make our strength equal to the peril of the hour. The first, and most essential step, is to bring our armed forces to the strength which minimum security requires.

Congress, recognizing the basic necessity for this step acted last year to remove statutory ceilings upon the size of the armed forces. In doing this, Congress relied on the Joint Chiefs of Staff to exercise their grave responsibility of determining the security requirements of the nation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have determined that our minimum security needs, at the moment, require an armed force of approximately

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[3]"National Affairs," Time, LVI (Jul. 24, 1950), p. 14. A division is a military unit capable of extended, independent action. Normal wartime division strength is approximately 20,000 officers and men. Division units include infantry and artillery regiments, and engineer, medical, motor transport, service, tank, and headquarters battalions.

[4]Ibid.

3,000,000 men, a figure which will be broken down at a later point. In accepting this determined figure, we shall be accepting the best strategic judgment of the man whose life work has been -- and is now -- the planning of the defense of this country.[5]

Equally important with a standing armed force of sufficient size is the requirement of a large, well-trained force of reserves which could be mobilized on short notice. It is not necessary or desirable to maintain an enormous standing army. As always, our real defense will be the citizen soldier. But there are points of difference from the past. One is that training is more essential than it ever was before, because of the complexity of modern weapons. Experience in both World Wars has shown that untrained troops suffer greater casualties. General Eisenhower has stated:

> In terms of the larger issue of victory or defeat, comparison is not possible, because in modern war it is not possible to win without training. But in the more personal matter of the individual's chance of survival, I should say that the trained combat soldier has at least three times the chances of the untrained to live to become a veteran.[6]

There will be little time for training troops in the next war; there should be enough basically trained men so that large units could be formed and deployed within a short period after

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[5] Universal Military Training and Service Act, Report, p. 3.

[6] Arthur S. Bevan and Bernard Brodie, Universal Military Training (Washington: U.P.O., 1947), p. 12.

the commencement of hostilities.

In our two most recent wars, the preponderant military and industrial might of the United States brought victory in the long run, but it could not have done so had not ample time been given us to prepare weapons and train men. In World War II, we were not entirely without preparation; because of Selective Service, we had, on Pearl Harbor Day of 1941, nearly a million men with some military training. Nevertheless, eight months passed before we were able to stage the limited offensive at Guadalcanal, and eleven months passed before we were ready for the major invasion of North Africa.[7]

There is no reason to believe that we shall have such a period of grace again; modern aggressors do not declare war. There will be no time to set up selective service machinery, build camps, find and train officers, induct trainees, and get them ready for whatever operations will be necessary. We must have a trained force large enough to make our resources and weapons instantly available for our needs. Such training must be given in time of peace.

As important as having a trained force ready to fight in the event of attack is having a trained force which may prevent war. It must be known that we are prepared to defend ourselves against aggression. Potential power will not save us; power in being, alone, will do that. We must have sufficient

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[7]Devan and Brodie, op. cit., p. 20.

trained men and equipment ready for instant defensive action, and behind them enough men and equipment for large scale defensive action at home or abroad within a matter of days.

II. MILITARY PERSONNEL NEEDS FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE

A. PRESENT STATUS OF ARMED FORCES

The armed forces of the United States have doubled in size since the start of the Korean war. When the North Korean Communists loosened off the Korean war by driving across the thirty-eighth parallel on 25 June 1950, the American armed strength on active duty was a mere 1,459,000.[8] Since then, six National Guard divisions and many reserve units have been called up. By 31 October 1950, the armed forces had reached a strength of 2,106,000, this strength being composed of 1,512,000 regulars, 497,000 reserves, and 107,000 inductees.[9] By 31 March 1951, an additional 450,000 men had been drafted, and these, together with additional reserves called to active duty, brought the armed forces up to a strength of nearly 2,900,000 men.[10] The rate of build-up in the past nine months has proceeded at a rate more than twice as fast as in the early days of World War II. In World War II, a strength of 2,900,000 was not obtained

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[8]Information obtained through correspondence with Bureau of Naval Personnel, Washington, D.C.

[9]Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, Hearings on S. 1, U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 82nd Cong., 1st sess. (Washington: 1951), p. 1230.

[10]Washington Post, March 31, 1951, p. 1.

until more than twenty-one months after our build-up started in June, 1940.[11]

President Truman, in a press conference on 21 March 1951, stated that

> the speed with which we have been able to strengthen our defenses should be a source of inspiration and encouragement to men everywhere who love freedom, and the Department of Defense will continue to build the strength we need, fully supported by the Congress and the American people.[12]

The present goal of the armed forces as determined by the Department of Defense is 3,500,000 men, this goal to be achieved by the end of 1951. An intermediate goal of 3,215,000 has been established to be achieved by 30 June 1951. It was expected that the 30 June 1951 goal would be reached by increasing the draft calls and calling more reserves to active duty, the armed forces then consisting of 1,795,000 regulars, 806,000 reserves, and 614,000 inductees serving in the armed forces.

Chart A on the following page presents the above figures graphically, showing the actual size of the armed forces on 30 June 1950, on 31 October 1950, on 31 March 1951, and the proposed size of the armed forces on 30 June 1951 and 31 December 1951.[13] The chart includes a breakdown of the armed

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[11] Washington Post, March 21, 1951, p. 1.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Universal Military Training and Service Act . . . Hearings, pp. 76-125.

CHART A

ACTIVE DUTY STRENGTH
ALL SERVICES



*Includes undetermined number of inductees
**Accurate breakdown not available

forces as to regulars, reserves on active duty, and inductees.

B. ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL NEEDS

The personnel needs of the armed forces may be divided into two basic requirements. First, there is need of sufficient men to build the armed forces up to the desired size within the immediate future, and second, there is need for sufficient men to be taken into the armed forces to maintain them continously at the desired size. These men would be required as replacements for regulars presently serving who will leave the service upon completion of their enlistments, for inductees who will complete their period of service, and for reserves who will complete their period of required service and must be separated from the service, as well as for casualties.

The first of these personnel requirements is comparatively simple to compute. To bring the armed forces up to the desired strength would require the induction of all the available personnel in the Selective Service Pool between the ages of nineteen and twenty-six, as well as the calling up of additional reserve units. To increase the armed forces from the 2,100,000 men which were on active duty on 31 October 1950 to the proposed 3,500,000 needed by the end of 1951 would call for the services of 1,400,000 more men. A proposed plan has been developed by the Department of Defense for securing these men

[illegible] by the Department of Defence for securing these two
[illegible] of 1'800'000 Swiss men. A disposal plan has been de-
[illegible] 9'300'000 persons in the war of 1941 mostly only for the
[illegible] men who retire or retire early on 31 December 1940 to the pro-
[illegible] tected reserve or active duty or 31 December 1940 to the pro-
tected reserve or active duty or 31 December 1940 to the pro-
tected reserve or active duty or 31 December 1940 to the pro-

and is shown graphically in Chart B on the following page.[14] As can be seen from the chart, it is expected that there would be approximately 40,000 enlistments from outside the Selective Service Pool, and approximately 144,000 enlistments could be expected from men under the age of nineteen. An additional 354,000 men in the reserves would be called to serve on active duty. This would still leave a need for 802,000 more men who would have to be inducted from the Selective Service Pool. This would bring the armed forces up to the proposed size and it is estimated that this could be effected by the end of the year.

The second requirement is that of personnel to be available to maintain the armed forces at the level of 3,500,000. It is obvious that large numbers of men will be needed to replace reserve units which have been called to active duty and are required by law to serve no longer than twenty-one months. In addition to the reserves, the inductees presently serving and those who will be called shortly, are required to serve only twenty-one months. It is evident then that there must be a pool of men available to replace these reserves and inductees at the end of their period of service, if the armed forces are to maintain their numerical strength.

An analysis of the Department of Defense study of this

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[14] Universal Military Training and Service Act . . . Hearings, p. 1229.

CHART B

1951 BUILD UP

3,500,000 BY 31 DECEMBER 1951



problem discloses the following personnel needs:[15]

1 Nov 1950 - 31 Dec 1951	862,000
1 Jan 1952 - 30 Jun 1952	641,000
1 Jul 1952 - 30 Jun 1953	963,000
1 Jul 1953 - 30 Jun 1954	720,000

It is expected that the induction of the above numbers of men into the armed forces during the periods indicated would maintain the armed forces at the proposed level of 3,500,000.

C. MILITARY MANPOWER POOL

The military manpower pool as discussed here includes all males between the ages of eighteen and thirty. The pool is broken down into the following age groups for discussion, first, the men in the age group from eighteen to nineteen, second, the men in the age group from nineteen to twenty-six, and third, the men in the age group from twenty-six to thirty. The eighteen-year-old group will be projected over a period of years to determine the number of eighteen-year-olds becoming available each year and the approximate percentage of them who would be available for military service. The second group corresponds to the Selective Service Pool and will be broken down as to elegibility for induction into the armed forces. The veterans of this group will be broken down further to determine their availability for service in the event certain changes are made in induction policies. The third group will be broken down as to availability for service in the event of

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[15] Universal Military Training and Service Act . . . Hearings, pp. 1232-3.

premium discloses the following personnel needs:[18]

1 Dec 1960 - 31 Dec 1961	[illegible],000
1 Jan 1962 - 30 Jun 1963	[illegible],000
1 Jul 1963 - 30 Jun 1964	[illegible],000
1 Jul 1965 - 30 Jun 1966	[illegible],000

It is expected that the induction of the above numbers of men into the armed forces during the periods indicated would maintain the armed forces at the proposed level of 2,100,000.

d. MILITARY EMPOWER POOL

The military empower pool as discussed here includes all males between the ages of eighteen and thirty. The pool is broken down into the following age groups for discussion, first, the men in the age group from eighteen to nineteen, second, the men in the age group from nineteen to twenty-six, and third, the men in the age group from twenty-six to thirty. The eighteen-year-old group will be projected over a period of years to determine the number of eighteen-year-olds becoming available each year and the approximate percentage of them who would be available for military service. The second group corresponds to the Selective Service Pool and will be broken down as to eligibility for induction into the armed forces. The veterans of this group will be broken down further to determine their availability for service in the event certain changes are made in induction policies. The third group will be broken down as to availability for service in the event of

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[18] Universal Military Training and Service Act . . . Hearings, pp. 1[illegible]-[illegible].

specified changes in the Selective Service Act or in current administrative practices.

The first of these groups is shown graphically on Chart C on the following page.[16] There are approximately 1,050,000 men between the ages of eighteen and nineteen. Of these, there would be approximately 545,000 men available for service immediately, and another 105,000 would be available upon completion of their high school training. Another 10,000 would be available within the following year when their occupational deferment was no longer necessary. The remainder of the group would be either unfit for military service due to physical and mental reasons, or would be eligible for continued deferment for occupational or dependency reasons.

Having determined the number of eighteen-year-old men now available for immediate service, it is desirable to analyze the future to determine the number of eighteen-year-olds that would be available for service each year. Chart D on page twenty-nine shows the approximate number of youths reaching this age each year and the number which would be available for military service if present induction practices were continued.[17] The male population from 1951 to 1960 was projected by the U.S. Department of Labor on 12 January 1951; this

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[16] Universal Military Training and Service Act . . . Hearings, p. 691.

[17] Ibid., pp. 345, 1228.

specified changes in the selective service act or in current administrative practices.

The first of these groups is shown graphically on Chart 6 on the following page.[16] There are approximately 1,000,000 men between the ages of eighteen and nineteen. Of these, there would be approximately 545,000 men available for service immediately, and another 108,000 would be available upon completion of their high school training. Another 10,000 would be available within the following year when their occupational deferment was no longer necessary. The remainder of the group would be either unfit for military service due to physical and mental reasons, or would be eligible for continued deferment for occupational or dependency reasons.

Having determined the number of eighteen-year-old men now available for immediate service, it is desirable to analyze the future to determine the number of eighteen-year-olds that would be available for service each year. Chart 5 on page twenty-nine shows the approximate number of youths reaching this age each year and the number which would be available for military service if present induction practices were continued.[17] The male population from 1951 to 1960 was projected by the U.S. Department of Labor on 18 January 1951; this

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[16] Universal Military Training and Service Act, . . . Hearings, p. 741.

[17] Ibid., pp. 540, 1224.

CHART C

MEN AGE 18-19 AVAILABLE
1 JULY 1951



CHART D

ESTIMATED NUMBER OF MEN REACHING AGE 18
DURING NEXT 10 YEARS AVAILABLE FOR SERVICE
ASSUMING PRESENT INDUCTION PRACTICES



represents the best prediction available. The determination of rejects and deferables is made on the same basis as current induction practices. Under current practices, approximately 21.0% of all registrants are rejected for physical or mental reasons, and another 13.2% are deferred for occupational or educational reasons. This leaves 65.0% of the registrants actually available for military service. It can be seen from the chart that there is a very gradual rise in the number of men available from 1951 to 1960 in this category, with the number of men being available annually never falling below 650,000.

Having considered the eighteen-year-old group, the next group to be considered will be the nineteen to twenty-six year old group. This is the group which is currently registered under Selective Service requirements; it contains nearly 8,000,000 men. Chart 2 on the following page displays this group graphically.[18] This group includes all men who are registered under the Selective Service Act of 1948. Of this group, there are approximately 2,860,000 men or 36% who are exempt from military service by statute, for reasons of previous service in the armed forces, either having served a minimum of ninety days during World War II, or a minimum of twelve months subsequent to World War II. Another small group

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[18] Universal Military Training and Service Act . . . Hearings, p. 690.

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [

CHART E

STATUS OF SELECTIVE SERVICE REGISTRANTS
AGE 18 TO 26 AS OF 31 OCTOBER 1950

7,957,157 - 100%



of 185,000 men is exempt from induction by reason of belonging to an active organized reserve unit. These men had no service in the armed forces, but have joined an organized reserve unit subsequent to World War II.

Another group of nearly 35% is exempt from induction at present under current administrative practices.[19] This group includes 763,000 men who are exempt by reason of occupational deferments, 570,000 of these being college students. It is expected that approximately 200,000 of these college students will have their classification reviewed and will be inducted into the service during the summer months.[20] Also in this group deferred for administrative reasons are 1,184,000 men who are exempt by reason of dependency. The majority of these are married men, with or without children, but a few furnish the full support of relatives of some sort. A third group deferred for administrative reasons consists of 71,000 men, including ministerial students and conscientious objectors. The largest group being deferred for administrative reasons includes 799,000 men who have been examined and rejected for physical or mental reasons.

Finally, 460,000 of the men registered in this group are already serving in the armed forces. This leaves 20.5% classified as I-A, or 1,633,000 men. Selective Service experience

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[19] Universal Military Training and Service Act . . . Hearings, p. 630.

[20] Ibid., pp. 78-9.

of 122,000 men is exempt from induction by reason of belonging to an active organized reserve unit. These men had no service in the armed forces, but have joined an organized reserve unit subsequent to World War II.

Another group of nearly 24% is exempt from induction at present under current administrative practices.[19] This group includes 762,000 men who are exempt by reason of occupational deferments, 270,000 of these being college students. It is expected that approximately 200,000 of these college students will have their classification reviewed and will be inducted into the service during the summer months.[20] Also in this group deferred for administrative reasons are 1,104,000 men who are exempt by reason of dependency. The majority of these are married men, with or without children, but a few furnish the full support of relatives of some sort. A third group deferred for administrative reasons consists of 71,000 men, including ministerial students and conscientious objectors. The largest group being deferred for administrative reasons includes 792,000 men who have been examined and rejected for physical or mental reasons.

Finally, 440,000 of the men registered in this group are already serving in the armed forces. This leaves 20.2% classified as 1-4, or 1,622,000 men. Relative service experience

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[19] Universal Military Training and Service Act . . . Hearings, p. 200.

[20] Ibid., pp. 70-8.

has shown that when this group reports for induction, that many of them will appear with new deferment authority which they did not have at time of classification. Experience has shown that approximately 50% of these men will be either rejected for physical or mental reasons or will be reclassified. Consequently, under existing standards and practices, only 50% or 816,000 of these men in I-A can be expected to be available for induction into the armed forces.[21]

Next to be considered are the men who are at present exempted from induction for various reasons, but who could be made available for induction by certain changes in the Selective Service Act or in administrative practices. First to be considered are the men in the age group from nineteen to twenty-six. Chart F on the following page shows graphically the number of men which would be made available by specified changes in induction practices.[22] If a decision were made to draft non-veterans with dependents, there would be 530,000 of them available, of whom 290,000 have no children, and 340,000 have at least one child. Similarly, if it were decided to draft veterans with less than twelve months service, there would be 100,000 of them available, of whom 40,000 were single, 40,000 were married non-fathers, and 80,000 were fathers. Veterans with less

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[21] Universal Military Training and Service Act . . . Hearings, p. 690.

[22] Ibid, p. 1232.

CHART F

ESTIMATED NUMBER OF MEN THAT WOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE BY SPECIFIED CHANGES IN SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT OR CURRENT ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES

Ages 26 to 30 as of 1 July 1951



Ages 19 to 25 as of 1 July 1951



than eighteen months' service would provide another 450,000 men and, finally, a decision to take all veterans would provide 1,580,000 additional men.

In the group of men between the ages of twenty-six and thirty, the non-veteran's group would provide 140,000 men, the group of veterans with less than twelve months' service would provide 170,000 men, the group of veterans with less than eighteen months' service would provide 340,000, and if all veterans were taken, 2,430,000 additional men would be made available.

D. PROPOSALS FOR UTILIZING THE MILITARY MANPOWER POOL

Considerations must be given to the utilization of the military manpower pool to bring the armed forces up to the required strength and to maintain them there. To bring the armed forces up to the initial proposed strength, it is recommended that the men now classified I-A in the Selective Service Pool be utilized first, to be followed by the group of men now deferred for educational reasons but who will probably be reclassified during the next few months. If these groups were not sufficient, it is recommended that the qualified men in the eighteen to nineteen year old group be inducted. These three groups would be more than sufficient to build the armed forces up to the 3,500,000 man level. To maintain them there, it is recommended that a program of universal military service be established.

Universal military service can be defined as a system

of raising an army whereby all male citizens become liable for military service in the armed forces at a designated point in their life, the nature and length of such service being determined by the needs of the nation. Such a system is universal in that obligation of service falls equally upon all males of the population, there being no exemptions from such service. The emphasis of such a system, naturally, is on military training and service. Military necessity would be the only justification for the establishment of such a system. Additional benefits in the form of an improvement in the education, health, morals, and patriotism of the nation would certainly be of value, but would not be in themselves sufficient justification for a program of this nature. Finally, a program of universal military service is distinguished from a program of universal military training by the fact that the former requires a period of active service in the armed forces upon completion of the basic training of the individual, while the latter is concerned only with the basic training period, training which is intended to prepare the individual for service at some future date when such service became a military necessity.

Universal military service as defined above has rarely, if ever, been achieved. This has been due to a variety of reasons, the inability to utilize the physically imperfect in the military establishments, the reluctance to separate men from their home and family life, the lack of finances to operate

such a system, and often just a general public disinterest in a program of this nature.

The program of universal military service, recommended at this point, would utilize those youths reaching the age of eighteen for a period of training and service of two years. It is from this group that the necessary numbers to maintain the armed forces at the proposed size would come.

Utilization of the manpower pool as briefly discussed above will be analyzed in greater detail in the fifth chapter. It will be analyzed to determine if the proposals will provide the manpower needed adequately, and if such proposals will result in the least cost to the government, in the least inequities to those who must serve and to those who have already served, and in the most efficient utilization of the available manpower.

In recommending that a program of universal military service be established, consideration should be given to such programs as they have been applied in the past and in other countries. Such a survey should determine the effectiveness of such programs and provide a basis for the determination of the type of program which could best be used in solving the problem now before the United States.

CHAPTER III

HISTORICAL SURVEY OF UNIVERSAL MILITARY SERVICE

In determining the role of universal military service in supporting the requirements of the national security of the United States, something may be learned by viewing universal military service programs as they have been applied elsewhere. This chapter will review briefly, the historical background of universal military service in several foreign countries. It will review the history of universal military service in this country; a history distinguished from the time of the thirteen colonies to post-World War II by numerous attempts to establish a workable universal military service program in peacetime. Lastly, it will review the present day programs of universal military service now in use in two European countries.

I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A. FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Since the dawn of history, compulsory military service has been an accepted philosophy of men and nations. In wars between primitive peoples, every man was expected to lend his strength to the strength of the group. The ancient Egyptians conscripted men to make up professional armies. The great Persian armies of Darius and Xerxes were composed of conscripts; so were the armies with which Alexander conquered the then

civilised world. In the days of the Roman Empire, the obligation of the citizens to bear arms in Roman legions was a basic principle of government. During the middle ages, military service as well as payment of taxes was an obligation of every freeman to his manorial lord, and of every nobleman to his king or emperor. Even when professional armies were attached to the court of every baron, prince, or king, the soldiers who made up these forces were often secured by a process of conscription, and professional armies were augmented in time of war by levies of citizens, drafted for temporary service.

Except for members of the professional armies, however, these conscripted soldiers were given little or no systematic peacetime training in the use of arms. They were available as manpower in emergency; but the military procedures of the time did not call for intensive training in preparation for service.

Not until the time of the French Revolution was the concept of universal service accepted. The general upheaval which followed the outbreak of the Revolution in 1789 swept away the old royal army of France, and simultaneously initiated a new problem of national defense. The theory of equality advanced by the revolutionaries logically led to the demand for universal service, and as the majority of the people were naturally reluctant to volunteer, universal service was tantamount to

compulsory enlistment. By December of 1793, the French people had accepted as an axiom that every adult male citizen of France must be a soldier, and every soldier a citizen. This axiom was given permanency in 1798 when the obligation to universal military service was incorporated into the organic law of the state.[1] The law called for men between the ages of twenty and twenty-five to be registered in five groups according to age, with conscripts being called each year from the youngest group; older groups being called out only if previous groups did not furnish sufficient numbers. After Napoleon's accession to power, the principle was extended to cover a wide production of men for war. In 1800, France provided Napoleon with 30,000 men; 60,000 in 1801; 60,000 in 1802; 60,000 in 1803; 60,000 in 1804; 210,000 in 1805; 80,000 in 1806; 80,000 in 1807; 240,000 in 1808; 78,000 in 1809; 160,000 in 1810; 120,000 in 1811, 237,000 in 1812; and 1,140,000 in 1813 --- a total of 2,815,000 in only thirteen years. These figures are not only interesting in themselves, but are indicative of the course of European warfare, and its nature, from 1800 to Waterloo.

> The cheapness of the musket as a weapon coupled with the democratic spirit of the age threw nations back to the primitive idea of military power, namely, the nation in arms. The theory that God marches with the biggest battalions coloured the entire strategy and tactics of the wars of the nineteenth century . . . this theory sprang full-armed out of the head of the French Revolution.[2]

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[1] J.F.C. Fuller, "Conscription," Encyclopaedia Britannica (1949), p. 203.

[2] Ibid.

Notice:

Fitz-Hugh Ludlow, "Consciousness," Dictionary of Modern Thought (1868), p. 1098.

Edward Fitzsimmons was of the head of the Indian Department's the move of the Cincinnati Western [illegible] was secretary of the army. The treaty also entitled [illegible] to [illegible] the Shawnee Prophet to military power," secretly, that Indian [illegible] the Canadian side of Lake Erie to [illegible] with the British [illegible] was the occasion, from 1800 to [illegible].

[illegible] Tecumseh," and was indicative of the increase of land-hunger [illegible] had also indicative of the increase of land-hunger settlers. Some Ohioans were not only interested in [illegible] 1810 was 1,196,000 in 1812 --- a total of 1,420,000 in early 1813 and 1,790,000 in 1813 --- a total of 1,920,000 in early 1814

Napoleon's conquests brought with them to the conquered countries the French law of conscription, which was immediately enforced. Prussia pursued this idea to its logical conclusion, and in 1808, "definitely affirmed the principle of universal service without distinction of class, or right of exemption by purchase."[3] With Prussias defeat in 1807 by Napoleon went the limitation of the size of her army to 42,000 men. Through conscription, a number of men were called, trained, sent home, and replaced by another group. Through this means, Prussia, by 1813, had 270,000 well-trained men, a reserve far in excess of the authorized standing army. This democratic system revived national ardor to the point where the army became a powerful factor in the final defeat of Napoleon.

France, after Napoleon, developed a conscript system which, in theory, was patterned on that of Prussia, but the purchase of substitutes and other vitiating techniques were such that by 1866, only thirty per cent of the soldiers actually were conscripts.

Prussia meanwhile, from 1815 on, expanded her army. Compulsory service brought all classes and ranks into close intercourse. The army became the national university in which was cultivated a common spirit. During the fifty years following Napoleon's defeat, the Prussian military machine separated the

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[3]Fuller, op. cit.

wheat from the chaff, turning out yearly, as it did, an increasing number of men whose physical training was vastly superior to the unconscripted men of the classes from which they sprung. This system of universal military service reached its greatest proportions in the sixties and provided the trained men whose immediate utilization resulted in the victories of 1866 and 1870 over Austria and France.

These Prussian successes had a great effect on army organization.

> Had the French long-service regulars won in 1870, then the world might have returned to armies of high quality. The Prussian victory, following so promptly upon their other victory over the Austrians, persuaded almost every civilized power to organize a mass army on the Prussian pattern. Austria had already done so in '66, France followed suit in '72, distant Japan in '73, Russia in '74, and Italy in '75. Spain and Belgium continued to modify the system by permitting the payment of substitutes. Outside of these countries, every healthy, adult, continental European male was legally liable to military service by the turn of the century, together with the Japanese, the Asiatic subjects of Russia and Turkey, and the great majority of South Americans.[4]

The burden of conscription varied enormously with the resources and military responsibilities of the various countries. Nowhere were all eligible men trained. In countries like Switzerland, Holland, and Sweden the service was so short that the armies were mere militias. In Japan only about a fifth of each conscript class was called up. In Spain, and still more in

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[4]Hoffman Nickerson, The Armed Horde 1793-1939 (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1940), pp. 198-199.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

South America, so small a proportion served that the idea of universal service was more a principle than a fact. Even in Germany only about fifty per cent of each annual class was trained. France, where universal service was voted in the spirit of patriotic self sacrifice, came nearest to making the ideal a reality, with nearly eighty per cent of each class actually serving.

This principle of universal military service, even though many countries realized it only imperfectly in practice, was nevertheless of enormous effect. More men were trained in arms than ever before, while the untrained but healthy men knew themselves to be subject to call in emergency. Meanwhile, population rose rapidly, and total wealth rose still faster. When fully mobilized, countries which followed universal military service could put into the field no less than ten per cent of its entire population. All told, therefore, no such armed hordes had been seen on earth as were being prepared immediately prior to World War I.

Two great powers, England and the United States, remained outside the system, neither having an apparent military problem serious enough to require a mass army. For England, the British navy remained a sure shield; the United States had weak neighbors and could be invaded from Asia or Europe only across prohibitively vast expanses of ocean. Consequently, both countries contented themselves with small volunteer armies backed

by inconsiderable volunteer militias for home defense.

Since the close of World War I, France, Italy, Russia, and most of the smaller nations of Europe have followed policies of universal military service, training their young men as they came to military age, and retiring them after a year's or two year's service to the status of civilian reserves. Germany was prohibited by the Treaty of Versailles from continuing her pre-1914 universal training policy. However, by making frequent changes in personnel in the army of 100,000 allowed her by the treaty, and through organization of various unofficial uniformed "marching clubs", Germany was able to approximate universal training for many of her young men. Following the rise of Hitler to power, she openly discarded the treaty restrictions and resumed her former system of universal military service.

With the expectation of war, England in 1939 instituted compulsory military training requiring 200,000 men between the ages of twenty and twenty-one to be trained for six months annually. The United States followed, in 1940, with a Selective Training and Service Act providing for the training of young men for a period of one year; with the proviso that a maximum of 900,000 men could be under training at one time. In less than a year the period of training was extended to two and one-half years. With the advent of World War II, both England and the United States turned to Selective Service to provide the

millions of men needed for an all-out war effort.

Since the close of World War II, compulsory military service has been by far the most common method employed to recruit armies. Compulsory military training is now in force in forty-one countries; in addition, two countries have a compulsory militia. Only six countries rely entirely on volunteers to fill their peacetime armies.

Great Britain still has its wartime National Service Act in force, with men between the ages of eighteen and twenty being required to serve two years in the Regular Army and then passing into the Territorial Army for reserve duty. The British are considering the possibility of retaining compulsory military service as a peacetime measure. If such a system is adopted, it will be the first time in modern history that England has had peacetime conscription.

In spite of the collapse of the French military machine during World War II, France has retained conscription as a basic part of her military system. However, the size of the army has been reduced, as well as the period of conscript service.

The Soviet Union follows its traditional policy of conscription and China has conscription of its statute books although it is only partially enforced.[5]

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[5] A Program for National Security President's Committee, p. 341.

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The six foreign countries which now have volunteer military systems are Australia, Canada, the Dominican Republic, Eire, India, and New Zealand. All of these except the Dominican Republic and India applied compulsion to service in their wartime armies, but have again reverted to their peacetime tradition of volunteer armies.

Mexico and most of our other southern neighbors have legislation for conscription on their statute books, although military requirements are not always enforced universally or equitably. Compulsory military service is retained in Mexico in peacetime for the educational benefits it offers. Almost seventy per cent of the Mexican population was illiterate before World War II, and it was found that army training was an effective method of reducing this illiteracy rate.

Usually, initial registration for military service in foreign countries takes place at the age of eighteen, with the men being called up for service between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one. In most countries, the statutory liability to military service extends until at least the age of forty-five. After the period of active duty, the men pass into reserve forces for a designated number of years, with the reserves being divided into classes depending on the age of the men and the length of time since they completed their initial military training. In most of the countries, training requirements and the liability to be recalled to active service

are greater for the younger men who have recently completed their active service than for those who have served a number of years previously. Although technical refresher training is required of reserves, many countries did not enforce this requirement before World War II because of lack of equipment, insufficient funds, or other reasons. This practice is being repeated in many European countries today and several countries have not reconstituted their reserve forces as yet because of financial reasons.

Many foreign nations also have requirements for military training of youths of pre-service age, with the training being compulsory in primary or secondary schools. Such early training generally consisting only of physical training, but it may later emerge into subjects more closely related to military skills.

B. UNITED STATES

As a nation of peace loving people, the United States has been traditionally a nation of volunteers, springing to arms in time of war to supplement a relatively small professional army. In our earlier years, reliance on voluntary service became, at times, a severe handicap. However, through the course of history, the American people have grudgingly come to admit that the power to conscript troops in wartime was a normal incident of the war power. As long ago as the War of 1812, Justice William Johnson of the Supreme Court predicted that "conscription will one day be adopted by the United States."

Applied with limited success in the Civil War, introduced with initial misgivings in World War I, and again adopted in 1940 against sporadic opposition, the prophecy of Justice Johnson has come true, in part.[6] But although American citizens have adopted universal military service in wartime, they have never, with the single exception of the critical months from 1940 to 1941, shown any willingness to accept such a program in times of peace. Proposals for such service, however, have existed from the beginning of our history as a nation.

The settlers of the original thirteen colonies brought with them the English military system of a self-armed citizenry, with each colony maintaining organized fighting forces for home defense, supplemented by such mercenary forces as were available. Military training as well as military service was required of the colonists. There were approximately one hundred provisions in the laws of the thirteen colonies requiring the military training of males.[7] Training programs of the colonies were not consistent, but generally required company drills to be held at irregular periods, at such times and places as the commanding officer might designate. These were not to be confused with training days and muster days which were held in the field and at the times prescribed by the legislature.

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[6]Robert E. Summers and Harrison E. Summers, comp., Universal Military Service (New York: Wilson & Co., 1941), p. 10.

[7]A Program for National Security President's Committee, p. 556.

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[6]Robert L. Branyan and Lawrence H. Larsen, comps., *Universal and Military Service* (New York: Wilson & Co., 1951), p. 10.

[7]*A Program for National Security*, President's Committee, p. 366.

Two to six training days were held each year and were, in the military sense, the graduating exercises of a finished course of instruction in company drill. Training days called for practice in close order drill, in the manual of arms, in extended order drill, and participation in sham battles. Muster days were usually held once a year and required the presence of every freeman in the colonies between the ages prescribed for military duty unless exempted. The freemen were examined as to fitness for military duty and mustered into the militia in their respective districts and required to attend company drill and training days. It was from these trained bands that the soldiers to be furnished in the various wars in which the home government was engaged during the colonial period were recruited. At first, this training was definitely universal, as all able-bodied males were compelled to train and serve in the colonial forces. However, as the frontiers moved westward and populations increased, selection was practiced and certain exemptions were allowed. Similarly, as prosperity increased and life became easier, avoidances crept into the law in the form of substitution for personal service, payment in lieu of service, and the like.

This general program of military training continued until the Revolutionary War. With its close, General George Washington presented his views on the subject in the form of a treatise entitled "Sentiments of a Peace Establishment." In it he said:

> It may be laid down as a primary position, and the basis of our system that every citizen who enjoys the protection of a free government owes not only a proportion of his property but even of his personal services to the defense of it . . . .[8]

General Washington recommended that all able-bodied men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five be regularly mustered and trained to provide a corps in every state to be employed in time of emergency. No action was taken on this plan and Washington later endorsed a plan developed by Secretary of War Knox. This second plan was presented to Congress in 1790. The Knox plan called for a few weeks' summer training during each of three years for men between the ages of twenty and twenty-one, the men to be enrolled in local units held in readiness for a call to arms, if necessary. Congress adjourned before taking action on the proposed plan.

Next, the Militia Act of 1792 was passed by Congress and called for every free, able-bodied, white, male citizen between the ages of eighteen and forty-five to be enrolled in the militia of his state, and that when called out to exercise or service, the enrollee should report, providing his own arms and provisions. Even had the citizen been willing to furnish at his own cost that which it was the unmistakable duty of th e government to provide, the future execution of the law depended on the voluntary and concurrent action of the states. This

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[8]John C. Fitzpatrick, edit., The Writings of George Washington, Vol. XXVI (U.S.G.O., 1944), pp. 339-40.

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[8] Jonas B. Fitzpatrick, edit., The Writings of George Washington, Vol. [illegible], 1940), pp. [illegible].

action was never achieved and the act was of no value.

From 1801 to 1809, President Jefferson pressed Congress to pass legislation requiring the establishment of a militia system which would require all males between the ages of eighteen and twenty-six to serve for one year. Despite the President's efforts, Congress gave no consideration to his proposal.

The first definite action towards military training in peacetime came in 1819 with the founding of the American Literary, Scientific, and Military Academy in Vermont. All young men attending this school were required to take military or naval training; this training being the counterpart of the Reserve Officers Training Corps which was created in 1916.

Similarly, the Morrill Act of 1862 which donated public lands to the states to be used in establishing colleges for the benefit of the agricultural and mechanical arts, required the offering of instruction in military tactics. Representative Morril felt that this military instruction would provide the means for each state to officer its own forces in time of emergency, a time in which the national military academy at West Point would be inadequate to provide the officers if a large army was suddenly required.

The next step was the Militia Act of 1903. This act established a militia consisting of every able-bodied male citizen of the United States between the ages of eighteen and

forty-five, to be divided into two classes --- the organized militia, to be known as the National Guard of the State, and the remainder to be known as the Reserve Militia. The act provided for the use of federal funds to provide the states with instructors and materials of war. The states were to be responsible for having their National Guard participate in practices marches or go into camp of instruction at least five consecutive days, and to assemble for drill and instruction in armories no less than twenty-four times annually. The first component of the Organized Reserves was created in 1908, in the form of the Medical Reserve Corps.

In 1911, Major General Leonard Wood, Chief of Staff of the Army, proposed a plan for national defense which provided for

> a short enlistment and a reserve with brief periods of training; making the Army not an establishment of elderly veterans, but a school for youth, taking in it tens of thousands each year and sending other tens of thousands back into the world, ready to come to the colors when the emergency arose, not as raw volunteers, but as men trained and ready to train others.[9]

Under General Wood's guidance, summer camps were set up at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania and Monterey, California to give training in military maneuvers, tactics, care of troops, camp sanitation, and rifle practice to students of various universities.

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[9]Hermann Hagedorn, Leonard Wood, A Biography, Vol. II (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishing Co., 1931), p. 110.

for
the newly produced a plan for political reform which envisaged
In 1918 Major General Leonard Wood[1] called in their of
the form of the federal government should
endorsed of the Progressive Movement the summer of 1920[2] in
campaigning the Jazz Age "Back-to-Normalcy" which promised. The first
Democratic Party and to dominate the 1920's until the Depression of
Republican measure or by late much of Depression of Great time
Republican the Party Great Political found Democratic
with Roosevelt and Democrats at men." The Eighty would in
Eighteen the the rest of Twenty Years to Create the White
the Democratic to be known as the Democrat Utility." The Act
Party" in the House as the Federal Board of the Civil" and
Commission" to be elected into the Senate --- the Eighteen

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[1] Leonard Wood, General Staff 1 Directorate, WWI, p. 116.
(See Index Entries 1 Commissioners Established 1914, 1917, 1918,

A great forward step in military legislation came with the National Defense Act of 1916.[10] This act established the Reserve Officers Training Corps, to be maintained in civil educational institutionals for the purpose of providing military instruction and turning out a substantial supply of junior officers for the Army. In addition, it provided for the establishment of training camps for such citizens as might be selected for instruction.

In early 1917, Secretary of War Baker proposed a plan for universal training of all able-bodied male citizens in their nineteenth year for eleven months, to be followed by two refresher courses of two weeks each --- one in their twentieth year and one in their twenty-first year.[11] Before any action could be taken on this proposal, the United States was in World War I and conscription became necessary to provide the necessary men.

After World War I had ended, there was a strong movement to introduce a system of universal training into the United States. Several bills were introduced into Congress calling for universal training programs but none were enacted into law. However, the National Defense Act of 1920 was passed, an act which did not basically change any of the training provisions

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[10] William A. Ganoe, The History of the United States Army (New York: Appleton-Century Co., 1942), p. 456.

[11] Universal Military Training, 80th Cong., 1st sess., S. Doc. 10, pp. 93-103.

of the 1916 act.[12] It did, however, provide for a more comprehensive peacetime military organization, and while the War Department still had the serious task of recruitment, expansion, and rearmament in time of emergency, it made provision for localized military units in the form of the highly skeletonized Organized Reserves.

From 1920 to 1939, little action was taken on the subject of military training in peacetime. However, during 1940, various proposals were made, culminating in the Selective Service and Training Act. This act provided for the training of a maximum of 900,000 men at one time for a period of twelve months or less, and that after this service, the inductees were to be transferred to a reserve component of the land or naval forces for ten years. In 1941, the period of training under this act was extended to two and one-half years. World War II followed and again the United States was forced to rely upon conscription to provide the necessary men to wage an all-out war.

Even during the war years, various proposals for the establishment and maintenance of a peacetime universal military training program were made and several bills were introduced into Congress. Since the end of World War II, considerations have been given by Congress to many proposals for universal military service programs, but there has been no concrete

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[12]William A. Ganoe, op. cit., p. 479.

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action has been taken on any of the several bills introduced.

II. FOREIGN SYSTEMS

Outside of the United States, compulsory military service is by far the most common method employed to recruit armies. Among the fifty-four foreign nations which have military organizations, compulsory military service is now in force, or, immediately prior to World War II, was in force in forty-six countries.

At this point, the systems of compulsory military service now in use in Sweden and Switzerland will be briefly reviewed. The systems in use by these two countries are fairly representative of the means by which a democratic country can build up a large military potential without the cost of maintaining a large standing army.

A. SWEDEN

Universal military training and service was instituted in Sweden in 1812, and in that year Sweden fought its last battle. At first, the training lasted only a few days, but in 1901, the period was extended to two hundred and forty days, and in 1914, to three hundred and forty days. After World War I, the period was reduced to one hundred and forty days with the result that by 1937, the Swedish Army had greatly deteriorated. Confronted with the rising tide of totalitarianism, Sweden extended the program to reorganize and strengthen the army. By 1945, the Swedish Army had greatly improved in ef-

fective quality, and this quality has been maintained by the programs of universal military training and service now in use.

The present system in use in Sweden consists of pre-military training and of compulsory military duty and assignment.

The pre-military training falls under four headings. First, general conditioning in the form of required gymnastics for boys, amounting to about five hours a week, is given in high school. Also, about one week of military instruction is given in high school, largely devoted to shooting. Second, membership in the home guard, which is voluntary, is confined to men over forty-seven and under twenty, and men of any age who are physically unfit for active service. The home guard trains four hours each week in infantry squad tactics and marksmanship with small arms. Third, outdoor sports and athletics, while voluntary, provide an important preparation for military training. Fourth, men and women of all ages are given civil defense training of a voluntary nature.

Under legislation, every Swedish male is liable for military service from the ages of twenty to forty-seven. During their twentieth year, all men are required to register at an area mustering office and with the regiment to which they have been assigned. For educational reasons, a boy may delay his training until his twenty-fifth year; and under certain circumstances, boys desiring officer or non-commissioned officer training may register during their nineteenth year.

At the time of registration, each youth is subjected to a rigid physical examination and placed in a category denoting his degree of fitness for active military service. Men determined to be temporarily unfit for service are placed in Class T and a final decision must be made concerning their fitness before they reach the age of twenty-two. Men permanently unfit for active service are placed in Class O and are assigned to such military tasks as orderly, clerk, chauffeur, etc.

Recruits are divided into two main groups for training. Ordinary conscripts are placed in Group I and are assigned to an arm of the service and to a unit stationed close to their residence. With this unit, each conscript receives his basic training, and to it, he generally belongs in peace or war until he is forty-seven years old. The second group, called Group K, includes graduates of secondary schools and volunteers who register early. The men in this group are assigned to units irrespective of their residence, or the location in which they will be stationed. This group represents a preliminary selection with a view to officer training. The instruction of this group is more intensive, but both groups are given essentially the same basic training. During the training, the men in both groups are carefully observed and those showing less ability in Group K are exchanged for the best men in Group I. At the end of basic training, the men remaining in Group K continue their training for regular or reserve

commissions, while those in Group I return to civilian life as privates in the reserve army.

The conscript normally begins his initial period of training in his twenty-first year, a period of training which lasts three hundred and sixty days. In addition, the conscript is required to take two refresher courses of thirty days each, the first to be completed before he is twenty-three, and the second before he is twenty-seven. Finally, each man must tak e an additional post-training course of thirty days before he is thirty-eight years of age. The compulsory training period is divided into two periods of about six months each. The first period is spent in individual recruit training given in the regiment; more attention is given to unit and winter training during the second six months period. In addition to physical training, motor driving, gunnery, and demolitions, the recruit training includes scouting, patrolling, etc. Unit training includes manoeuvers, combat firing, and defense against airborne attacks. The object of the refresher courses is to provide an opportunity for exercises in territory and under conditions unfamiliar to the man, and to teach him the use of new weapons.

Those selected from Group K for officer and non-commissioned officer training are required to take additional courses. Those selected for non-commissioned officer training take an additional one hundred and eighty days of training while those selected for officer training take an additional one hundred

and eighty days after completing the non-commissioned officer training course.

B. SWITZERLAND

Switzerland was the first nation in modern times to introduce compulsory military service. For centuries it has been the best armed democracy in the world with respect to its needs and represents an outstanding example of a modern nation which has succeeded in solving the difficult problem of defending its democracy without, on the one hand falling into or under totalitarianism, or on the other, becoming recurrently involved in depleting wars.

How has this been achieved?

> The most obvious reply to the question is, of course, the Swiss topography. And without doubt, the limited access to armies through mountain passes and the high cost in time, men, and equipment of waging war across the rugged Swiss terrain militate against invasions of that country. But Switzerland is also the intersection point of Europe where the Rhone, Rhine, Danube, and Po Rivers meet, while across its valleys and mountains lies the shortest route from north to south and east to west of Europe. Its topography, moreover, represents only one factor in its defense, and one which is to a large extent offset by the relatively small number of men available for active warfare and the existence of three very different and deeply rooted cultures within Swiss borders. An additional and important, if not the determining, factor is the kind of military training invoked by the Swiss people and the methods chosen by the Swiss government for putting it into operation, not to mention the responsible attitude of the average Swiss citizen towards the defense of his country for which universal training may be largely credited.[13]

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[13] A Program for National Security, President's Commission, p. 207.

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[illegible].

b. Interpretation

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [

Under the Swiss Military Constitution, every male Swiss citizen between the ages of twenty and sixty is subject to compulsory military service. His military obligations fall into five categories. First, personal military service in the first line from twenty to thirty-two years of age. Second, service in the second line from thirty-three to forty years of age. Third, service in the territorial army from forty-one to forty-eight years of age. Fourth, service in the auxiliary service from forty-nine to sixty years of age. Fifth, a payment of a military tax if he lives outside the country, or is declared unfit for military service. There are no exemptions from military service for industrial reasons. Besides those physically unfit, only members of the Federal Council, clergymen, medical directors, directors of penitentiaries, police in organized police corps, members of the frontier guard, and officials indispensable to the general home front in time of war, may be exempted from service. Conscientious objectors are not exempted, but are allowed to take their training in one of the noncombatant services. According to the constitution, women can be conscripted for the auxiliary service, but women have been accepted only as volunteers thus far.

Pre-military training is voluntary and is not integrated with the educational system. Schools are required to reserve three hours a week for gymnastics and additional time must be devoted to hikes and games. Voluntary pre-military training

starts when the boy leaves school at fifteen and continues until nineteen. It comprises training with military preparatory companies which exist in most towns with instruction by citizen officers, rifle clubs which are supplied rifles and ammunition by the government, cadet corps which train in infantry drill, map reading, and target shooting, and compulsory gymnastics for recruits who have been pronounced fit for service but have failed to pass the gymnastic tests at time of recruitment.

Youths are normally called for training during the year in which they become nineteen years of age, however, the stage of their schooling is considered, and they may complete their secondary education or apprenticeship. The recruits are physically examined and placed into categories as being physically fit for active service, suitable for auxiliary service, or unfit for either service.

At the time of recruitment, men are assigned to a specific branch of the service in accordance with their previous knowledge, experience, or trade training. When the basic training begins, the recruits are divided into companies, sections, and squads, in their branch of the service. Training periods range from one hundred and sixteen days to one hundred and thirty days, depending upon the branch of service. Special technical instruction may be given to certain men after completion of their basic training in special fields.

In addition, seven refresher courses of twenty days each are required while the men are in the first line group. In the second line group, one refresher course of twenty days is required. Also, four supplementary courses totaling twenty-four days are required for the territorial troops.

The instruction of recruits includes everything that will prepare a soldier for his specific job as a machine gunner, mortar gunner, or whatever it may be, from the individual training of the squad to the teamwork of the battalion. During the recruit training, tasks are assigned up to the full measure of each man's strength and the best of which he is capable is demanded.

At the end of the course, recruits are assigned to a battery with which they serve the next twelve years, that is until they are thirty-three years of age and are automatically transferred from the first line to the second line. The fact that a man knows his comrades and has learned to work with them during a long period constitutes an important factor in the smooth functioning of the unit.

CHAPTER IV

PROPOSED UNIVERSAL MILITARY SERVICE PROGRAM

Having made a historical survey of universal military service as it has been applied in the past in several foreign countries and of the many attempts to apply it in the United States, the next problem is to determine the type of universal military service program which might best serve the United States in its current preparations for national security.

Such a program must accomplish the objectives of national security which justify the adoption of such a program to the greatest possible degree. Its principal emphasis must be on military objectives. Wherever possible, without sacrificing essential military objectives, the maximum advantages in terms of health, education, character development, and training for citizenship should be integrated into the program. It is realized that such non-military advantages would be limited and would in no way substitute for the training and care which the individual would normally receive in his home, school, church, and community. But, the program must also reduce to a minimum, consistent with its military objectives, the disadvantages and dangers inherent in the operation of a program of this nature. The possible impact of such training on the lives of individuals and institutions must be recognized and dealt with. The program must be operated, consistently with the

attainment of other objectives, at a minimum of cost to the Federal government, the economy at large, civilian institutions which would be affected, and the individuals undergoing the training. Finally, the program must be so designed that it is properly within the powers of the Federal government.

Recognizing the possibility that a program of universal military service may eventually be installed in this country, the United States Army became interested in developing new principles and techniques for the handling of young soldiers. To this point, a Universal Military Training Experimental Unit was established at Fort Knox, Kentucky.

> The trainees were volunteer recruits. This unit aimed at treating the individual as something more than just another spoke in a tremendous wheel. The policy of "decent human relations" and maintaining intimate personal contact between the administrative and trainer cadre and the trainees was adopted. This gave the administrative and trainer cadre an opportunity to observe the trainees' development more closely and to be in a better position to counsel and guide them at the time it would do the most good. The legendary tough sergeant and the dumb recruit no longer had a place in this type of organization.
>
> The old "cuss 'em out" technique was eliminated and was replaced by a procedure of detailed orientation and explanation. This placed the cadre personnel on a higher level, consequently giving them more dignity. An increase in dignity in the members of the cadre was directly reflected in the trainees, and with it came an increase in their self-respect and personal pride. With this type of approach the trainees were expected to become better soldiers and subsequently better citizens. This experimental unit was used in an attempt to sell the public and Congress on the idea that military training was not an evil thing, which ruined every man who was required to serve his country in its military forces. By utilization of these methods, procedures, and principles it was shown how men could be trained mentally, morally,

and spiritually as well as physically.[1]

I. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

The most important principle for such a program if it is to succeed is universality. The program must be universal in its application to all persons of a given age or status, and the obligations which it imposes on each must be equal. Democracy requires that the obligations of citizenship be shared commonly by all, without favor or discrimination, and not exclusively by those who choose to shoulder them. It must be recognized that equality of obligation is not the same as identity of obligation. Recognition must be given to the ways in which a particular individual is best fitted intellectually and physically to contribute to the common welfare. This principle of universality must be extended to the maximum, and the training, in one form or another, must apply to all who are physically and mentally able to prepare for any form of useful service to their country in time of crisis. Only those whose period of service would cause extreme hardship at home, or who are so physically handicapped that they could make no material contribution should be excluded. These grounds of exclusion must be based on carefully prescribed regulations.

A second principle for a successful program is that of equality --- the equality of privilege and opportunity for all

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[1] William S. Huff, Counseling Responsibilities of a Company Commander in an Army Training Division (M.S. thesis, Ohio State University, 1950), pp. 5-6.

those taking part in the program. At no place in the program should there be discrimination for or against any person or group because of race, class, national origin, or religion. There would be no place for segregation or special privileges. To permit this would nullify the important living lesson in citizenship which would be provided by such training.

A third principle is that of responsibility. Such a program must be the responsibility of the American people as a whole, rather than the exclusive or principal responsibility of the military authorities. It must be a national enterprise undertaken with the full realization that the problem of common defense has become one in which every individual, civilian or military, must share. The entire people must understand that the security of the United States requires their direct interest, attention, and understanding, and that for a program of this type to succeed, it must take their complete support.

II. GENERAL STRUCTURE OF THE PROGRAM

The general structure of the program will be described briefly at this point and in greater detail in a later section. Universal military service should be the obligation of every male American upon reaching the age of eighteen, or upon completion or abandonment of his secondary school education, whichever comes later. For each youth who is physically and mentally qualified, such training should be of a predominately

military character and specifically designed to prepare him for service in one of the armed forces. For those unfitted for training of this nature, the program should be preparatory for service to the nation in whatever capacities they might best serve. Persons having sincere conscientious objections to service of a military character should be given training in non-military activities which would be of importance to the country. Only those who could not perform any useful form of service in time of crisis would be relieved entirely of the obligation of such training and service.

The program itself should generally be divided into two parts. The first part would be a basic training period devoted to instruction in the fundamentals necessary for satisfactory performance of future service, this basic instruction to be for a period of approximately six months. The second part of the program would call for approximately eighteen months of active service in the regular armed forces, with the obligation for such service being altered only if the trainee should elect to enlist in one of the regular armed services, or if he should qualify for and desire advanced education and training in officer training programs similar to the reserve officer's training corps now being carried on through many civilian educational institutions under the control of the Army and the Navy.

The program as a whole would depend upon the combined ef-

fect of the basic training and the period of active service in the armed forces for its full effectiveness and the attainment of its objectives.

III. CONTROL, DIRECTION, AND ORGANIZATION[2]

The control and direction of the training program is of utmost importance to the ultimate success of the undertaking. It is proposed that the training program be placed under the general control and direction of a commission of three members, reporting directly to the president. Such a commission would be composed of two civilians and one military representative, with one of the civilians being designated as chairman.

Such a commission, with a civilian majority and a civilian chairman would follow the fundamental policy of American democracy of placing final responsibility for decisions concerning important military matters in the hands of civilians. It would emphasize the conviction that such an undertaking must be a civilian effort which is participated in by the people and which has all the safeguards that the civilian community could desire.

Such a commission, however, must have military representation. The best policies for such a program would represent a synthesis of both military and civilian thinking. The several services, if they are to be held responsible for the actual

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[2]A Program for National Security, President's Commission, pp. 44-50.

operation of the program, should have a voice in the formation of those policies which they are to carry out. In addition, it is desirable for the military to share in the responsibility to the public for the success of the program.

It must be emphasized that only individuals of the highest type should be selected to serve as members of the commission. The broad implications of this program to so many phases of life, and its direct relation to the young men of the country, require that the persons selected have a thorough understanding of the patterns of American life and have a deep consciousness of American ideals, traditions, and institutions.

Such a commission should have full authority to set the policies and standards for the training program and to supervise its execution within the framework of the legislation authorizing such a program.

To provide the commission with the best technical advice available on matters that enter into the program, and to draw the civilian community further into every phase of its operation, it is recommended that a general advisory board be established, such a board consisting of from fifteen to twenty-five persons. These persons would be appointed by the president, principally from civilian life, and would include some representation from the armed services. Its members should include persons who could be considered broadly as representing the entire public, while others should be outstanding leaders

in the fields of recreation, religion, education, and health. Such a board could set up special committees from among its members to study special phases of the program and to advise the commission, or assist the operating agencies, in solving problems or in developing policies in fields in which they have special competence.

Such committees would be established to review medical, psychiatric, educational, religious, and recreational programs, to assess their success, and to recommend improvements in them. Such a board should include representatives of the armed forces, first, to provide a technical committee to review the military training itself periodically, and second, to provide competent military advice for the board as a whole.

Also, it is recommended that the commission be provided with a staff of full-time civilian inspectors whose functions would be, first, to keep the commission fully informed as to the manner in which the program is operating in the field, second, to advise the commission of the extent to which its policies are being carried out in practice at the local level, third, to provide an avenue through which any individual in training may submit complaints with an assurance that they will be considered by someone outside the operating agency under whose jurisdiction he falls, and fourth, to locate any incompetent or irresponsible training personnel, and to discover malpractices in the camps.

The operation of this inspector corps would be similar in many respects to the operation of the Inspector-General's Department in the Army with one important exception; it would report, not to the chief of the agency which it was inspecting, but to the commission which supervised such an agency. This inspector's corp is not meant to take the place of regular inspections by the service's own inspection agencies, rather such inspections should be carried on at the same time, and carried on vigorously.

The actual operation of the program would, as it applied to persons qualified for military training, be the responsibility of the several armed services. As to persons not qualified for any form of military training or who are conscientious objectors, the commission should determine the extent to which their training should be handled by these services, by other existing agencies of the Federal government, or through new organizations created by the commission. The commission itself should not attempt to operate any phase of the program directly, but in all cases each operating agency should be required to follow the policies and standards as established by the commission.

It is also recommended that volunteer civilian advisory committees, composed of representative citizens, be established in the largest city in the immediate neighborhood of each training camp. Its object would be to work with the commanding

officer of the camp on non-military aspects of the program, and particularly those relating to the health, education, religion, morals, and recreation of the trainee. The authorities in charge should cooperate extensively in handling some of the many off-post problems that will inevitably arise in such a training program. A committee such as this has performed notable service in Louisville, Kentucky, in connection with the Fort Knox Experimental Training Unit.[3]

The operation of a program of this type would require the establishment of a selective service system patterned generally after the one used in World War II. Such a system should consist of a national office and a system of local civilian boards, the entire system to operate in accordance with policies and standards prescribed by the commission and under its general supervision.

The local boards should have the power to register every male after he reaches the age of seventeen, to determine which individuals are physically and mentally qualified to undergo training of some type, and what type of training each individual should have, to pass upon requests for temporary deferment based on extreme hardship or temporary disability, to decide what persons should be directed into special forms of training by reasons of their conscientious objections, and to

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[3] A Program for National Security, President's Commission, p. 48.

prescribe the time at which each individual will undertake his training.

IV. BASIC TRAINING AND SERVICE

A. Age[4]

Various factors are important in determining the general age level or status in life at which the obligation to undertake such training and service should attach. These include the extent to which training at various ages would cause individual or institutional dislocations, and the time at which, and the circumstances under which, training would be the most advantageous from a military standpoint.

For an increasing number of American boys, the completion of the secondary school education represents the first significant transition point in life, and on the average, this event roughly coincides with the individual's eighteenth year. One continuous phase of life has been completed and another is about to begin. The boy either goes directly into a vocation or undertakes an entirely new stage of education, customarily after an interval of two to three months. A training program of this type, as it relates to this group, then would in general, cause the least disruption if it could follow graduation from high school and precede the formation of permanent employment ties, the commencement of a new educational cycle, or the

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[4]Universal Military Training and Service Act, Report, pp. 10-32.

assumption of other responsibilities.

For the group of youths whose schooling ends at a lower level, the transition is normally to employment or to vocational or apprenticeship training. Thus, before eighteen, many of these individuals have already made the major change. A boy in this category would probably prefer to take his training at the time he makes the shift, rather than at eighteen, when it might force him to sever certain ties temporarily.

From a military standpoint, there would be a great advantage in having the persons undergoing training at the same general age level and development. The simultaneous training of persons of great variance in ages would complicate training and introduce substantial difficulties.

It is recommended, therefore, that the obligation to undertake training should attach upon a boy's attainment of the age of eighteen, but with the following exceptions, first, that a boy with the consent of his parents or guardian, should be able to voluntarily commence such training at any time after reaching the age of seventeen; second, that the training of any person who is in secondary school when he attains the age of eighteen, be deferred until such time as he either completes or abandons such school; and third, that performance of the training should also be deferred, but not beyond the twentieth year, when its immediate performance would result in serious hardships to an individual, or to persons heavily dependent upon

such an individual. Questions of deferment would be for the determination of local boards, in accordance with policies and standards prescribed by the commission.

In the case of every individual, the obligation to register for such training with his local board should attach upon his attaining the age of seventeen.

Such determination of the training age would insure trainees who are nearly all of the same age, and would provide for the least disruption of the individual's life.

D. STATUS AND RIGHTS

The status and rights of the individual will differ during his period of training and his period of service. During the initial training period, the individual must make a difficult transition from civilian life to military life. Careful consideration must be given to the status of the trainee during this transition period.

During this period of training, the trainee should have rights similar to those he would have had as a civilian, consistent with the program's objectives. Military training necessarily requires discipline and a substantial restraint of personal freedom. The trainee should be subject to strict discipline, but the sanctions for enforcing such discipline should be somewhat different than those contained in the Articles of War. A system of discipline should be adopted for the purposes and circumstances of the training program. Such a disciplinary program will be discussed at a later point. With the completion

of the initial training, the individual should have made a satisfactory adjustment to service life and should be prepared to take his place in one of the regular armed forces to complete his obligation of service to the country.

With the individual's entry into the regular armed forces for his period of service, his status of trainee should be terminated and he should assume the same status as a regular member of the armed forces. He should have the same rights and privileges, and should be subject to the same discipline as the regular members of the armed forces.

C. LENGTH AND SCHEDULING OF SERVICE

The determination of the length and the scheduling of the basic training period and the period of service call for careful consideration. A consideration must be given to the extent to which such training and service would cause individual and educational disruptions.

It is recommended that the basic training period should extend for a period of approximately six months, should take place entirely in camps or special training centers, and should be of the same duration for all persons. It is felt that training for a shorter period would not meet the minimum military objectives of the program. From a purely military standpoint, it would be desirable if the basic training period could be longer. However, it is believed that the most basic and essential elements of soldiering can be taught successfully in six months,

and that such training would prepare the individual to take his place in one of the regular armed forces.[5]

It is realized of course, that the period of basic training during World War II was usually much shorter, but it is felt that Army practices during the war should not be followed in this program. First, no period of training in peacetime can be effective as a comparable period in wartime since a peacetime program cannot be surrounded by that sense of immediate urgency which is possible during a period of war. Second, the wartime needs of training were often fixed by the desperate need for troops in front-line positions, rather than by considerations of the most desirable length. Third, a basic training period in wartime was usually followed by advance training in which the lessons of basic training were usually emphasized or augmented. While it is possible that the trainee may receive continued training during his period of service, it is desirable that he receive the fullest possible training during the period of basic training.

Having set the basic training period at six months, the problem of scheduling arises. It must be determined how many times a year the complete basic training period should be given, and the starting date of each period. Basic legislation should should provide for certain flexibility in this regard, and the

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[5] A program for National Security, President's Commission, pp. 54-5.

commission should be empowered to make such determinations, modifying them from time to time in the light of practical experience, and in view of any future educational developments which would be significant.

It is recommended that two training periods be conducted each year, the first to commence in May and run through October, and the second to commence in November and to run through April. It would be expected that high-school graduates intending to go to college or directly into a vocation other than agriculture would generally comprise the complement of trainees for the first period, while persons already employed or who desired to go directly into agriculture would constitute the bulk of those in the second period.[6]

An effort should be made to keep the training load relatively constant, although the number in the first period would tend to be larger. However, the heavier load of this period would fall during the period of the year when more training facilities would be available from a climatic standpoint, and when it might be possible to obtain a substantially larger number of trainers from reserve officers.[7]

The period of service to be completed by the individual after the basic training period has been completed would

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[6] A Program for National Security, President's Commission, pp. 57-61.

[7] Ibid.

consist of a period of approximately eighteen months service in one of the regular armed forces, such service to commence immediately upon completion of basic training. Such a period of service is necessary to build the armed forces up to the desired point, and also desirable from the standpoint of economy of money, effort, and time. The longer the term of service, the less wastage of men being transferred from station to station, and the less men needed in the training establishment. General J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff of the Army, has stated:

> The shorter the term of service, the less time you have for men actually on duty with our units in the field, the greater rotation, and therefore greater wastage of manpower . . . in the course of movement overseas and movement back home again . . . in the longer period of service we can have the experience of these men, which they take time to gain, for a much longer period of time on active duty . . . that gives us a more effective army in the field.[6]

D. CHARACTER AND CONTENT OF THE BASIC TRAINING AND SERVICE

It is believed that the primary emphasis of the program must be upon two things: first, military training, and second, instruction in the meaning and obligations of citizenship.

The military training must be of a serious realistic nature adapted to preparing a man for possible service in war. The program must not be diluted by attempting to inject a large number of other things which might entail risk or

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[6] Universal Military Training and Service Act, Report, p. 36.

[illegible] Military Training and Democracy [illegible]

failure of the entire program. This does not mean that one cannot, without danger to military training, introduce training of the other types.

The technical details of the military training will not be covered here, but would normally be determined by the needs of the particular services. However, such training should be constantly reviewed, both by the commission and the several services to make certain that it is consistent with the latest results of scientific research and the latest developments in weapons and techniques of warfare.

Training in citizenship should be an integral component of the basic military training. The most important part of this training comes from the very fact of participation in the program on a parity with all other young male Americans and in the discharge of a definite obligation to the country. Participation in an effort for the common good should give every trainee a very concrete idea of his duties as a citizen. It is recognized that the development of good citizens must depend in a substantial measure upon a process of education which begins in childhood and upon the kind of environment in which a boy grows up. It is not expected that failures in early training can be compensated for fully in the training period, but much can be done by the program itself. The boy undertakes his training at an age when his interests about the world begin to broaden. An intelligent program at this age can stimulate and

broaden his interests and increase his concern with the welfare of his country and his fellow men at home and abroad.

E. TRAINING PERSONNEL.

A program of this type will depend largely upon the quality of leadership, competence, and character of the men who are in charge of training at all levels. The providing of the required number of qualified trainers presents the greatest single operating difficulty of the program itself.

To operate the program, service personnel would have to be taken from the regular armed forces, forces which are already hard pressed to carry out their missions with personnel now available. There is hope that the importance and character of a program of this type would attract into the armed forces for temporary or permanent duty many men to whom the older type of military career in peacetime was not so attractive.

Also, it is expected that once the training program has been started, that a considerable number of trainees who carry their work most successfully and with the greatest interest may be induced to enlist for regular service. These would include privates and non-commissioned officers, as well as young officers from the reserve officer's training programs.

Equally important is the quality of the trainers. Procedures for selecting, training, and retaining men of high caliber must be established. Before undertaking an assignment in the training program, each trainer should be given a certain

amount of instruction, and a thorough grounding in the information program.

The President's Advisory Commission on Universal Training stated that:

> The present experimental-training unit at Fort Knox and the Army's information and education programs are under exceptional leadership and are unquestionably finding out how to do a superior training job. Before undertaking an assignment in the training program, each trainer must be given a certain minimum amount of instruction. In general, the techniques presently employed by the Army are reasonably well adapted to this end. They consist primarily of taking prospective trainers to the experimental unit at Fort Knox, and allowing them to observe and participate in the program at that installation for an extended period of time. Moreover, when the program is finally in operation, it should be expanded slowly --- certainly no more rapidly than the availability of good personnel who have been trained in this fashion to take over the expansion. We repeat that all training personnel must have a thorough grounding in the information program.[9]

F. DISCIPLINE

It is recommended that the trainee be subject to a special code of conduct during his period of basic training; such code to be developed by the commission and submitted to Congress for its consideration. Such a code should reflect the youth of the trainees, and the fact that they are separated from home and family, many for the first time. Harsh and repressive punishments such as are provided for under existing service regulations should be avoided.

Punishment for offenses should be of a uniform nature, and

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[9] A Program for National Security, President's Commission, p. 67.

[illegible] of [illegible], and a thorough [illegible] in the [illegible]-
[illegible] policies.

The [illegible]'s [illegible] [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] plans.

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

the possibility of the use of trainee courts for minor offenses should be considered. Such courts at Fort Knox have operated justly and efficiently.[10]

Also, full use of psychiatrists and trained social workers should be made in connection with serious or repeated offenses.

C. PHYSICAL AND MENTAL HEALTH OF TRAINEES

It is realized that no program of this short duration can possibly make up for the failures of our society to provide proper medical care and the other elements of sound health during the first eighteen years of a person's life. It is believed, however, that a program of this character can and should provide for correcting those physical defects which are still correctable within a period of several months at the age of eighteen, defects such as hernia and bad teeth. It could and should also provide opportunity for the partial correction of some other factors causing bad health, such as undernourishment and overweight.

In addition, the thorough physical examinations incident to this program will make possible the discovery of many other defects which could not be corrected by the training program but could be brought to the attention of the individual for correction.

In general, the physical training contemplated in the program would be beneficial to the youth, the extent of these benefits largely depending upon those habits of physical

fitness which would be formed during training and carried over by him in subsequent living habits.

The possibility of emotional disturbances in some trainees as a result of new surroundings and group pressures of the training experience must be considered. Such disturbances must be kept at a minimum by providing the most expert psychiatric advice and care.

This problem can be solved if the program is well run and represents a useful experience for the men in terms of their own personal future, and in terms of an understood contribution to the necessary preparedness of their nation against a future emergency. It is of utmost importance that there be a high quality information program which will give every man such an orientation and understanding of his role and its relation to the scheme of things in order that his psychological problems will be reduced.

H. EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES

It is doubtful whether such a program would on the whole have a net educational value for the average individual. It can, however, provide some positive educational values in certain specialized instruction. Insofar as formal or vocational education for the average trainee is concerned, these advantages are definitely and narrowly limited. Any effort to introduce such education on a large scale would fail in its purpose, and, at the same time, would materially detract from the

accomplishment of necessary military objectives. Opportunities for such educational assistance would include tutorial assistance, some vocational classes, testing and accreditation, and the various courses and services made available by the United States Armed Forces Institute.

In addition, there is great opportunity in this program for extensive vocational guidance which could be of great benefit to every man in selecting the right occupation and in deciding what further education, if any, he should undertake. The armed forces already include a great deal of individual testing as part of their regular program of classification and assignment. It would not be difficult to supplement this program with vocational aptitude tests which could, with the results assembled from the trained observation of persons during the basic period, provide a sound basis for individual counseling.

In addition to the above, it would be possible during such training periods significantly to reduce illiteracy among successive generations of male youth as they reach maturity. The success of the armed forces literacy program during World War II is a clear indication of what can be done in this respect. While the present existence of extensive illiteracy is a serious indictment of our educational system and a condition which should be corrected at its source as promptly as possible, a program of this nature could and should take advantage of the training period to remedy present deficiencies.

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I. MORAL AND RELIGIOUS ASPECTS OF TRAINING

It is realized that a serious moral problem is presented by the very removal of eighteen-year-olds from the normal influence of their home, church, school, and local community, and their comparative isolation in a camp with large numbers of men under an entirely new and different environment.

It is not believed that this problem is insoluble, but that good counseling, together with good educational, ethical, and religious guidance can go a long ways towards solving the problem. The experimental unit at Fort Knox has, in addition to giving trainees spiritual guidance into their respective faiths, also made available to boys of no religious faith instruction in those fundamentals from which all moral values stem.[11]

There is no reason why a high moral level cannot be maintained through the influence of leaders of high caliber, a point which must be considered in the selection of men to act as commanding officers of the training camps. It is equally important that other officers and non-commissioned officers who will take part in the training be carefully selected and given proper training in the problems of the eighteen-year-old. The assistance of local communities must be enlisted, not only in stamping out vice, but also in providing wholesome activities

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[11] A Program for National Security, President's Commission, p. 72.

for the men off the post.

Also, there should be a great emphasis on activities which are confined to the post by the adoption of a heavy on-duty program which would include many normally off-duty activities, and abundant recreational facilities and high-quality entertainment should be provided in the camp themselves.

The assistance of the community should be solicited in suppressing prostitution and vice in civil communities adjacent to the camps, and in limiting the opportunities of the trainee to purchase alcoholic beverages, either on the post, or in civilian establishments.

In addition, a well-rounded educational program should be carried on under the joint direction of the chaplain and the medical officers, a program designed to show the moral and physical reasons for avoiding exposure to venereal diseases. It is illustrative of what can be done along these lines to note that after five months of training, there developed among the six hundred and sixty-four trainees at Fort Knox only two cases of venereal disease --- and both cases developed in trainees who had been absent without leave for several days.[12]

Finally, a careful selection of camp sites must be made, avoiding areas where wartime experience or area studies indicate the existence of unfavorable community conditions.

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[12] A Program for National Security, President's Commission, p. 74.

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[12] A Program for National Security, President's Commission, p. 74.

V. TRAINING FOR THOSE NOT QUALIFIED FOR MILITARY SERVICE

Fundamentally, there are two classes of persons who would not undertake training of a military nature. The first group would consist of those persons who, as conscientious objectors, would resist any training which was connected with, or under the direction of, the military. Their beliefs should be respected, and their basic training program should be framed with these beliefs in mind. The construction of such a program should present no serious difficulties since there are many useful services which such individuals could conscientiously render in time of emergency and for which advance training would be valuable. This was clearly demonstrated in the last war when conscientious objectors performed outstanding services in hospitals, on farms, and in non-military scientific and experimental work of great importance. The particular projects to be included in this program should be determined by the commission after detailed consideration, and after consultation with the church bodies from which most of these men come or which represent their religious convictions. Training programs for such individuals should be conducted at training sites which are apart from those employed in military training, and should be under exclusive civilian control.

The second class of persons exempted from training of a strictly military nature would be those who cannot qualify for such training because of physical or mental handicaps. Many

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of these persons are useful citizens capable of rendering important service to the country in time of war providing their handicaps are either overcome by treatment or properly taken into account. The commission should consider the types of service which different classes within this group are capable of performing, and the kinds of programs best adapted to train men for these services. Particular attention should be directed to the adaptability of these men for various essential home defense tasks for which advance training would be useful. The commission should determine whether programs of this character should be made the responsibility of the armed forces, or should be placed under the direction of some other government agency.

VI. OPTIONS

The options herein discussed would take effect after the trainee has completed his six months' basic training in a training camp. These are options only in the sense that the trainee may choose one from among them, the selection of one of them being mandatory.

Upon his completion of the basic training, the individual should be grounded in the fundamentals of soldiering and would be qualified for many useful and necessary forms of military service. However, in spite of the basic training, a man would not be prepared for immediate service as an officer, or to take over, without further instruction, some of the highly

technical jobs which constitute such a large and important element in a modern military force. Moreover, his actual utility for immediate, effective service in a military operation would remain limited until he was integrated into an active military organization and trained to work as an integral part of it. The options should be designed to take care of these problems -- to provide the opportunity and occasion for officer and specialist training and to bring men into units where they can learn to use the lessons of basic training in group action.

First, the trainee, irrespective of the service under which he receives his basic training, should be able to discharge his entire obligation by serving for approximately eighteen months in that service. This option has a significant military value in that it would give the service the opportunity to give the man certain kinds of long-term specialist and group training. Qualified persons in this group should have the opportunity to attend service schools. Others should be given training in actual leadership by using them in cadres for the operation of the basic training of a succeeding class of trainees.

Second, a trainee should be permitted to discharge his obligation by enlistment in one of the regular services for at least the minimum term of enlistment, provided that he has the minimum qualifications therefor at the time of his

application and that a vacancy exists.

Third, entrance into a regular service academy should be considered an option and no person should be admitted to one of these academies who has not completed the basic training period. Future officers should have this experience, an experience which would permit them to understand the problems of the enlisted man. Limited facilities would make this option available to only a few men and their selection presents a special problem because of existing laws relating to service academy appointments.

Fourth, the trainee should have the option of enlistment in the Enlisted Reserve Corps for a fixed period of enlistment, or enrollment in and reserve officer's training corps course at a college or university, with an agreement to accept a reserve commission, if offered, upon graduation therefrom.

The commission should have general control and supervision of the options, but the actual operation of the options should be in the hands of the particular service involved. It is imperative that the options be handled in a competent manner if the program as a whole is to be successful.

VII. SERVICE IN RESERVE ACTIVITIES[15]

It is believed that is is necessary to require that service in the reserves be obligatory for men who have completed their

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[15] Universal Military Training and Service Act, Report, pp. 53-54.

basic training and service under this program.

To realize fully the benefits of universal military service, it is necessary to retain a continuing right to call for the services of the young men who receive the training. Furthermore, it would be wasteful to the national strength to maintain a reserve force only at the whim and preference of individuals.

Essentially, the requirements of national strength require a minimum armed forces in being, and a maximum reserve force in readiness. The larger and more effective our reserve force, the smaller the standing force can become. It is in the interest of national economy to assure a large and effective reserve at all times.

It is recommended all persons completing the training and service under this program be required to serve for a period of approximately five years in the reserve after completion of their active duty. This time requirement could be reduced by service in the National Guard or in other organized units of the reserve components of the regular armed services.

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION OF THE PROGRAM

For a program of universal military service to be acceptable, it must be shown that it can produce the desired results; in this case, the providing of an adequate number of men to maintain the armed forces at the proposed level. As was discussed at an earlier point, the only justification for a program of this nature is military necessity. If such a program can achieve the military objectives under circumstances which will strengthen the spirit of democracy, and prove of value from a physical, mental, and moral standpoint to the youths undergoing training and service, there is even more reason for adopting it. However, it can not be overemphasized that the chief aim of and the only ultimate justification for adopting such a program is the achievement of military security and peace for ourselves and the rest of the world.

At this point, the program will be discussed from the viewpoint of fulfilling its military objectives. In Chapter II, several proposals were made for bringing the armed forces up to the desired level, and in Chapter III, a program of universal military service was outlined to maintain the armed forces at this level. These proposals will be analyzed to determine if they can produce these desired results. Other means of reaching these objectives will also be considered.

I. DISCUSSION OF THE PROPOSED SOLUTION

A. ABILITY TO PROVIDE NECESSARY PERSONNEL.

The best criterion for judging the effectiveness of a program of this nature is its ability to provide the men necessary to maintain the armed forces at the desired level. This, then, will be the criterion on which the proposed program for universal military service will be judged.

An analysis will be made to determine if the proposals made in Chapters III and IV will provide the necessary men to build the armed forces up to the 3,500,000 man level, and to maintain them at that figure. In Chapter II, it was determined that approximately 1,400,000 men would be needed to build the armed forces up to this level, and that the following numbers of men would be needed in the designated periods to maintain them at that level:

31 Dec 1951 - 30 Jun 1952	641,000
1 Jul 1952 - 30 Jun 1953	963,000
1 Jul 1953 - 30 Jun 1954	720,000

The Department of Defense anticipated that this requirement of 1,400,000 men needed initially could be met partially by the calling to duty of 554,000 reserves.[1] The Department of Defense further anticipated that there would be approximately 144,000 enlistments by youths under the age of nineteen, and another 40,000 by men outside the Selective Service Pool.

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[1] Universal Military Training and Service Act . . . Hearings, pp. 90, 1228.

[2] Ibid.

I. [illegible]

A. [illegible]

The last criterion for judging the effectiveness of a program of this nature is its ability to provide the [illegible] to maintain the armed forces at the desired level. This, [illegible], will be the criterion on which the proposed program for universal military service will be judged.

An analysis will be made to determine if the proposals made in Chapters II and IV will provide the necessary [illegible] to build the armed forces up to the 4,000,000 man level, and to maintain them at that figure. In Chapter II, it was determined that approximately 1,000,000 men would be needed to build the armed forces up to this level, and that the following numbers of men would be needed to the designated periods to maintain them at that level:

11 Dec 1951 - 30 Jun 1952	[illegible]
1 Jul 1952 - 30 Jun 1953	[illegible]
1 Jul 1953 - 30 Jun 1954	[illegible]

The Department of Defense anticipated that this requirement of 1,000,000 men needed initially could be met partially by the selling to duty of [illegible] reserves.[1] The Department of Defense further anticipated that there would be approximately [illegible] enlistments by youths under the age of nineteen, and another 60,000 by men outside the Selective Service Pool.

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[1] Universal Military Training and Service (4) . . . Hearings, pp. [illegible], 1950.

[2] Ibid.

Using these figures as a base, there still remains a need for 662,000 men.

In Chapter II, it was proposed that this need be met by the induction into the service of the physically qualified men presently classified I-A in the Selective Service Pool. In addition, approximately 300,000 men now classified II-A by reason of educational deferments would be reclassified and made available for active duty. Finally, it was proposed that the physically qualified men in the age group from eighteen to nineteen be made available for service.

It was further proposed, that one the armed forces had been built up to the desired level, that a system of universal military service be established to provide the necessary men to maintain that level.

A graphical analysis of these needs and the men provided by the proposed solutions is presented in Chart 3 on the following page. The chart is so designed that the requirements of the armed forces in terms of manpower are shown by the bars below the center line. The men available for service are shown by the bars above the center line.

The analysis will begin with the period from 1 November 1950 to 31 December 1951 and extend over the following three years. This period of enlargement of the armed forces and the initiation of the universal military service program would be the most critical period. Subsequent years would be fairly comparable to the years analyzed at this point, and should pro-

Using these figures as a base, there still remains a need for 800,000 men.

In Chapter II, it was proposed that this need be met by the induction into the service of the physically qualified men presently classified 1-A in the Selective Service Pool. In addition, approximately 500,000 men now classified 1-A by reason of educational deferments would be reclassified and made available for active duty. Finally, it was proposed that the physically qualified men in the age group from eighteen to nineteen be made available for service.

It was further proposed, that are the armed forces and have built up to the desired level, that a system of universal military service be established to provide the necessary men to maintain that level.

A graphical analysis of these needs and the men provided by the proposed solutions is presented in Chart 6 on the following page. The chart is so designed that the requirements of the armed forces in terms of concerns are shown by the bars below the center line. The men available for service are shown by the bars above the center line.

The analysis will begin with the period from 1 November 1950 to 31 December 1951 and extend over the following three years. This period of enlargement of the armed forces and the initiation of the universal military service program would be the most critical period. Subsequent years would be fairly comparable to the years analyzed at this point, and should pro-

CHART I

MILITARY MANPOWER PROGRAMS FOR SERVICE
BASE D, MAINTAINING TOTAL FORCE OF 3,000,000
PERIOD 01 DECEMBER 1950 THROUGH 30 JUNE 1951

vide no greater problems.

The first period from 1 November 1950 to 31 December 1951 is concerned primarily with building the armed forces up to the desired level. During this period, there would be approximately 815,000 physically qualified men available from the Selective Service Pool classification of 1-A. In addition, there would be approximately 200,000 more men available who are now deferred for educational reasons. The Department of Defense expects that these men will become available through reclassification upon completion of the present school year. Finally, there would be 401,000 men available in the eighteen to nineteen year old group. This group originally included approximately 545,000 men who were physically qualified for service, but as was discussed earlier, approximately 144,000 of these men could be expected to enlist voluntarily. These three groups of men would provide a total of 1,417,000 men who could be qualified and available for induction into the armed forces. The Department of Defense expects that 832,000 of these men will be called to serve by the end of the year. This would leave approximately 585,000 men in the pool for a margin of safety which will be discussed at a later point.

During the second year of the program, there would be approximately 760,000 men available for service in addition to the men remaining in the pool from the previous year. This group would come from three sources. First, during this period

area be "average household".

The final factor from I mentioned [MOD] as if [illegible] that
it necessary [illegible] with [illegible] some biases in to
the desired [illegible]. Instead this factor" should be [illegible]
[illegible] 10^{3},000 [illegible] quantity was available [illegible] the
[illegible] 10^{3},000 some one available [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] 10^{3},000 some one available [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

approximately 1,052,000 men will reach the age of eighteen. On the basis of present selection practices, sixty-five per cent of these men would be qualified for military service, or in this case, approximately 685,000. In addition, there would be another 68,000 men available from the eighteen to nineteen year old group previously discussed. These men were not available during the previous period due to deferments given to them for educational or occupational reasons. Department od Defense figures indicate that approximately 641,000 men would be needed during this period to maintain the armed forces at the proposed level. Considering these needs, the men in the pool at the beginning of the period, and the men becoming available during the period, there would be a remainder of 702,000 men in the pool at the end of the period.

During the next period, ending 30 June 1958, another 1,041,000 men would reach the age of eighteen; of these, approximately 677,000 would be qualified for service. In addition, another 31,000 men would have their deferment ended by reason of having completed their high school education. This would make a total of 708,000 men available in addition to the men remaining in the pool from the previous period. From this group, it is expected that the armed forces will need 963,000 men. This is a greater amount than was needed in the previous period, but is necessary due to the completion of the period of service of the greater part of the reserves

who had been called to active duty. After taking that group from the pool, there would remain approximately 827,000 men.

During the final period considered here, ending 30 June 1954, there would be another 1,090,000 men reaching the age of eighteen, of which 710,000 would be qualified for service. Service requirements during this period would be approximately 720,000 men. Men remaining in the pool at the end of this period would number approximately 817,000.

Subsequent periods would find slightly larger amounts of eighteen-year-olds becoming available each year and service requirements remaining approximately the same. It may be anticipated that as more and more men become available for service, the period of service might be reduced from eighteen months to a shorter period. It must be remembered that the program was set up with two objectives in mind. First, the training of every youth in basic military subjects as he reached the age of eighteen, and second, the providing of the large numbers of men needed to maintain the armed forces. The program was so designed that the first objective might be met by the six months training period, and the second objective met by the period of eighteen months service. It should be obvious that as more men become available for this period of service, the period of service could then be decreased in length. It is conceivable that a point might be reached where the armed forces could either be reduced in strength or would have adequate

voluntary enlistments to maintain their desired strength with the result that there would no longer be a need of requiring the period of service in the regular forces upon completion of the basic training course. In this event, the program would consist only of the six month's basic training and the reserve service requirement.

As was previously mentioned, a margin of safety must be included in the calculations and allowed for. The primary purpose of the margin of safety is to provide a source of manpower which would be available for service during the period in which a man reaches the age of eighteen and is being processed for service. For example, a man born on the last day of the fiscal year would be counted as belonging to the group of men available during that period, but since current induction practices require from forty to ninety days of processing, the man would not actually be available for service until August or September of the next period.

When this problem was under consideration by the United States Congressional Committee of Armed Services, Major General Lewis B. Hershey, Director of Selective Service, stated that a minimum safety margin should consist of approximately six times the number of men which would be called into the service each month.[3] Under current induction practices, approximately 80,000

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[3] Universal Military Training and Service Act . . . Hearings, pp. 822-25.

voluntary enlistments to maintain their desired strength with the result that there would no longer be a need of providing the period of service in the regular forces upon completion of the basic training course. In this event, the program would consist only of the six month's basic training and the reserve service requirement.

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Upon this problem was under consideration by the United States Congressional Committee of Armed Services, Major General Louis A. Hardway, Director of Selective Service, stated that a minimum safety margin should consist of approximately six times the number of men which would be called into the service each month.[5] Under current induction practices, approximately 80,000

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[5] Universal Military Training and Service Act . . . Hearings, pp. [illegible].

are inducted into the service monthly. This would necessitate a safety margin of 450,000 men.

Comparing this safety margin of 450,000 with the proposed induction requirements as previously discussed and displayed on Chart 6, it can be seen that the requirements of each period can be met and the safety margin maintained. During the first period, there would be a surplus of 75,000 men over the safety margin, during the second period, a surplus of 302,000, during the third, a surplus, of 57,000, and finally, during the fourth period, a surplus of 27,000. These surpluses, with the exception of the second period, are not large, and indicate that the program is utilizing the manpower pool effectively and efficiently.

Having determined that the proposals advanced in this thesis can effectively build up and maintain the armed forces at the desire level, a consideration should be given to other possible means of reaching the same final results.

B. COMPARISON WITH ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

In comparing the proposed solution as offered by this thesis with other possible solutions, it must first be determined what alternative solutions are available.

Basically, there are two alternative proposals which will be considered at this point. First, the possibility of inducting men who are presently deferred for dependency reasons, and second, the possibility of utilizing the veterans in the Selective Service Pool. The number of men that would be made

available under these proposals is provided by Chart F on page thirty-one.

It can be seen from the chart that there are 630,000 non-veterans between the ages of nineteen and twenty-six and 140,000 non-veterans between the ages of twenty-six and thirty. These can be broken down further into 20,000 men with no dependents, 330,000 married non-fathers, and 420,000 married fathers.

The group of veterans with less than twelve months service includes 180,000 men in the nineteen to twenty-six age group, and 170,000 in the twenty-six to thirty age group. In the group of veterans with less than eighteen month's service, there are 430,000 in the younger age group, and 340,000 in the older age group. Finally, if all veterans are considered, there would be 1,880,000 in the nineteen to twenty-six age group, and 2,430,000 in the twenty-six to thirty age group. The majority of the veterans in these groups are married fathers, or married non-fathers, with a relatively minor number being single.

The problem then is to determine if these groups could provide the necessary manpower and, if so, if it would be more desirable to utilize these groups in preference to the eighteen year olds.

The group of non-veterans totaled 630,000. It is very likely that a large portion of these men would not be able to

qualify physically for service. On the basis of present induction practices, approximately fifty per cent of these men would be physically unfit. This would leave a remainder of 315,000 men who could be expected to qualify for service, an amount too small to relieve the necessity of taking men from the eighteen year old group.

Next to be considered is the group of veterans with limited service. It must be noted that nearly one third of the men discharged with less than twelve month's service were given medical discharges. In addition, many men discharged after short periods of service were found to be mentally, morally, or psychologically unsuited for military service. It is believed that very few veterans with less than six months of service would qualify under present standards. After making allowance for probable disqualification and occupational deferments, it is estimated that a maximum of 160,000 veterans under twenty-six years of age with less than twelve months service would be available for service if the laws were changed to permit their induction.[4]

Of these, about one-fourth would be single men without dependents, with the remaining three-fourths consisting of fathers and men with dependents other than children. Obviously, this group could not provide nearly enough men to

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[4] Universal Military and Training Act . . . Hearings, p. 695.

eliminate the necessity of taking the eighteen year olds. Also, if it were decided to make use of this group, the Selective Service System would have to register all the 2,500,000 veterans in this age group to ascertain exactly who would be liable for induction. The cost and administrative burden imposed by such registration would be out of proportion to the small number of additional men that would be made available.

Lastly, a consideration must be given to the possibility of utilizing all the veterans in the age group nineteen to twenty-six. This group contains approximately 1,580,000 men, of which 490,000 are single, 570,000 are non-fathers with dependents, and 720,000 are married fathers. There would be a sufficient number of men in this group to eliminate the need for taking the eighteen year olds initially. However, this group would provide only the men needed at the outset to bring the armed forces up to the desired strength. It would not provide the necessary men needed annually to maintain the armed forces at the desired level.

In the final analysis, the only group discussed above which could provide sufficient men to obviate the taking of the men in the eighteen year old group would be the group of veterans with over twelve month's service, and this would necessitate the taking of veterans with dependents as well as those without dependents.

The utilization of this group of veterans would not, how-

ever, relieve the eighteen year olds from the necessity of serving in the armed forces, but would merely postpone such service for one year. It must be decided, then, whether to build up the armed forces initially by utilizing the men in the group of veterans with over twelve month's service, thereby postponing the induction of the eighteen year olds for one year, or to utilize the eighteen year olds immediately, requiring now the period of service which they would be called upon to render eventually.

It is proposed that inasmuch as the eighteen year old must serve eventually, it would be better form his viewpoint to serve at the age of eighteen. A program which inducts the individual for training and service at the age of eighteen would be at the point where he would have had the opportunity to complete his secondary education, but would not have had a chance to become established in a civilian occupation or higher educational institution. This would have less impact on the individual and the national economy than if such training were postponed for one year. It would be impractical for the individual to attend college for one year, then perform his period of service and training for two years, then return to college for completion of his education. Similarly, the individual who graduates from high school at the age of eighteen but would not be subject to induction until age nineteen would find it likely that his employment opportunities would be limited to casual or

blind-alley jobs, since few employers would be inclined to initiate extended training of young men for short periods of employment. Finally, dependency problems would be minimized since only a very small proportion of men -- about one per cent -- are married at the age of eighteen. Thus, it would seem that from the individual's standpoint, the age of eighteen would be the most satisfactory age to begin service and training since the natural break between secondary school education and either advanced education or entry into civilian employment occurs at this point. Induction at this age would be least disrupting to the individual.

Another significant advantage of the eighteen year old over the veteran with dependents is the great difference in the cost of the training program. Figures on the cost of training 630,000 eighteen year olds as compared with the cost of training an equivalent number of married men with dependents were computed by the Department of Defense. A total of $513,000,000 would be saved in one year by training eighteen year olds in preference to the married veterans because of dependency benefits.[5] A savings of this amount cannot be ignored when extended over the period of years which a program of this nature would be expected to run.

It appears, then, that it would be more desirable to take

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[5] Universal Military Training and Service Act, Report, p. 18.

the eighteen year old group immediately in preference to postponing their service one year, such postponement forcing the use of veterans with over twelve months service. The use of the eighteen year olds would interfere with the ordinary civilian pursuits of the minimum number of people, and disrupt normal family life and the national economy the least. In addition, the age of eighteen seems to be the most natural point for the individual to undergo such training and service, causing the least disruption to his educational program or entry into civilian occupational fields. Finally, the money savings to the country is of such a substantial amount that it must be considered in setting up a program of this nature.

II. ANALYSIS OF THE VARIOUS ASPECTS OF PROGRAM

In this section will be discussed the military benefits and the economic benefits of a program of this nature. In addition, the legal aspects and the political aspects of the program will be considered.

A. MILITARY BENEFITS

Generally, a program of universal military service would provide two distinct military benefits. First, it would provide for the military training of the youth of the country, and second, it would provide a source of trained men by which the armed forces could be maintained at the proposed level.

Fundamentally, the program would give the men training

in the essentials of soldiering which would be the basic prerequisites for technical, specialized, or unit training in an emergency. In addition, the program would accomplish the following:

1. It would enable the men to be initiated into military life, and to make the substantial psychological adjustment from civilian to military life.

2. It would familiarize them with the handling of military weapons, a familiarity which would be of value even in the use of new weapons which might be developed.

3. It would teach the trainees to think like soldiers in military organizations and to develop habits of responses to situations that will save lives in event of war.

4. It would impart to each trainee the great psychological understanding that he has, and is performing, a duty to his country -- a duty that is not his hired duty, but part of his obligation as a citizen.

5. It would offer an opportunity for some unit training and thus teach men the fundamentals of integrated group action.

6. It would make possible the selection for promotion of those youths who displayed the rudiments of leadership.

These are the principle benefits which would be achieved by the training period and are of extreme importance in integrating the trainee into service life.

The period of service which the trainee would be obligated

to fulfill after his training period was completed would further accomplish the benefits outlined above. The greatest accomplishment of the period of service, however, would be the maintenance of the armed forces at the proposed level. The accomplishment of this objective is the primary justification for a program of this nature at this time, and the fulfilling of this objective is the principal benefit of the period of service.

B. ECONOMIC BENEFITS

Plans for national defense must take a realistic account of the financial ability of the country to support the measures that are considered necessary. We must have protection without such prohibitive costs that it would bankrupt the nation or destroy the ability of the government to provide the human services deemed essential to a healthy, prosperous America, and for the discharge of our world responsibilities.

A standing, professional armed force of sufficient size to ensure adequate protection would require the expenditure of prohibitive sums. An addition, it is inconceivable that enough men could be induced in peacetime to enlist in the regular armed services to give us security in time of war. Finally, the maintenance of a peacetime professional military establishment involving millions of men would disrupt every branch of our civilian life and our productive energies.

Only through a universal military service program can we

get the kind of armed forces that would be both adequate and within our financial means. This does not mean that universal military service represents an inexpensive way to buy security. It does mean that the cost in proportion to the return will be much less than under any alternative method of raising our military potential to the level required in the current state of world affairs.

By using universal military service to maintain the armed forces at the desired level, two objectives are accomplished. First, the armed forces have a regular supply of men to maintain their proposed level, and second, the men after completing their period of service and returning to civilian life as members of a reserve, provide a pool of trained replacements on which to draw in time of emergency. The combination of a minimum standing army coupled with a maximum well trained group of reserves guarantees the greatest military potential possible at the least cost to the national economy.

C. LEGAL ASPECTS

Close consideration must be given to the power of the federal government to enact legislation of the type necessary to establish a program of universal military service. The constitutionality of a program of this nature is best tested by examination of the Selective Draft and Selective Training and Service legislation of World Wars I and II.

Provisions of the United States Constitution pertinent to

this matter state that

> The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay debts and to provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States . . .
> To declare War . . .
> To raise and support Armies . . .
> To provide and maintain a Navy . . .
> To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces . . .
> To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing powers . . . .[6]

That these enumerated powers were ample to sustain the Selective Draft Law of 1917 was definitely and firmly established when the constitutionality of the statute was attacked from every standpoint. The constitutionality of the statute was sustained by a unanimous Supreme Court verdict.[7]

So comprehensive and powerful was the opinion in the above case, that when Congress enacted the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, the only new point which it was possible to raise was the circumstance that this second act had been passed when the United States was at peace. The argument against the statute was that Congress lacked power to draft the nation's manpower prior to an actual declaration of war. The contention was immediately rejected by the courts and the constitutionality of the act was sustained.[8]

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[6]Art. I, sec. 1.

[7]Selective Draft Law Cases (1918), 245 U.S. 366.

[8]United States v. Lambert (1941), 123 Fed. Supt., 2d ser., 595, 596 (C.C.A. 3).

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

Judge Goodrich, of the Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, stated in his decision of the above case that:

> Alexander Hamilton, writing in The Federalist, remarks that " the ceremony of a formal declaration of war has of late fallen into disuse" and points out that if the presence of any enemy within our territories must be awaited before the legal warrant for self-protective measures was received, "we must receive the blow before we could even prepare to receive it." There is certainly no less disuse of the formal declaration of war now than there was in the days when Hamilton wrote. Instances where a nation at peace has found an invader withit its gates without warning are fresh in the minds of all. The power granted to Congress by the Constitution to "provide for the common defense" and to "raise and support armies" is not to be interpreted in a way in which will make the power ineffective against an enemy, actual or potential. We are not precluded from preparing for battle, if battle must come, until such time as our preparation would be too late.[9]

It is firmly believed, therefore, that such legislation as is needed to establish a program as outlined in this thesis would be entirely constitutional.

D. POLITICAL ASPECTS

Equally important with establishing the legality of such legislation is the encouragement of Congress to enact it. Such legislation is contrary to national tradition, however, it would seem that in the face of conditions unprecedented in the history of this country and of the world, that this consideration would not seem to have logical priority; nevertheless, it is in all probability the most influential argument advanced against universal military service because of its emotional

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[9]123 Fed. Rept., 2d ser., op. cit.

Judge Hoffman, of the Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, stated in his decision of the above case that:

> Congress [illegible], writing in the Constitution, [illegible] that "the performance of a [illegible] obligation of war has of late fallen into disuse" and points out that if the provisions of our army rules and regulations must be [illegible] before the legal [illegible] for self-preservation [illegible] "we must revolve the time before we could even prepare to resist it." There is certainly no less [illegible] of the formal [illegible] of war now than there was in the days when [illegible] wrote. Prudence [illegible] a nation at peace has [illegible] in invader [illegible] its [illegible] in the [illegible] of all. The power granted to Congress by the Constitution to "provide for the common defense" and to "raise and support armies" is not to be interpreted in a way to [illegible] will [illegible] the power [illegible] against an enemy, actual or potential. We are not [illegible] from preparing for [illegible], if [illegible] need, until such time as our preparation would be too late.[1]

It is firmly believed, therefore, that such legislation as is needed to establish a program as outlined in this thesis would be entirely constitutional.

[illegible]

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[1] [illegible], op. cit.

overtone.

Except for a period in 1940, when war was imminent, the United States has never had compulsory military training in time of peace. Opposition to universal military service is based on respect for American liberties and a rightful jealousy in preserving them against any encroachment. Such opposition deserves the utmost consideration. A system of universal military service which would destroy our freedom, debase our national respect for the rights of the individual, and opened the way to dictatorship would be a cure worse than the disease. Many Americans are convinced that any system of universal military service would do just that to us, by submitting a whole generation to military regimentation.

Fortunately, however, this view is not shared by the majority of the American people. In general, public opinion tends to favor the establishment of a program of this nature. Public opinion polls which have been conducted over a period of years have shown a consistently favorable opinion towards a program of universal military service. The American Institute of Public Opinion has conducted nine national surveys on the question of military training for all able-bodied young men. The highlights of the trend as shown by these surveys are as follows:[10]

10"Military Training Approved," Columbus Citizen (Columbus, Ohio), Dec. 9, 1950, p. 11.

overtime.

Except for a period in 1960, when war was imminent, the United States has never had compulsory military training in time of peace. Opposition to universal military service is based on respect for American liberties and a rigorous jealousy in preserving them against any encroachment. Such opposition deserves the present consideration. A system of universal military service which would destroy our freedom, deserve the national respect for the rights of the individual, and oppose the way to dictatorship would be a more worse than the disease. Many Americans are convinced that any system of universal military service would do just that to us, by submitting a whole generation to military regimentation.

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[12] "Military Training Approved," Baltimore Sunday (Baltimore, Ohio), Dec. 6, 1960, p. 11.

	Yes	No	No Opinion
Dec, 1942	68%	27%	7%
Nov, 1945	75%	21%	4%
Jan, 1948	65%	24%	11%
Aug, 1950	78%	17%	5%
Dec, 1950	72%	20%	8%

From these surveys, it is apparent that the majority of the American people would favor the establishment of a program of universal military service. The problem, then, is for Congress to translate the expressed wish of the American public into legislation establishing a program of this nature.

Date	In	In Question
Dec. 1810	466	41
Jan. 1811	412	67
Feb. 1811	421	71
Mar. 1811	401	78
Apr. 1811	376	82
May 1811	350	86
June 1811	329	91

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

This final chapter of the thesis will be divided into three sections. The first section will present a brief summary of the thesis itself; the second section will briefly present the various recommendations made, and the third and final section will present the conclusions as determined by this thesis.

I. SUMMARY

The first chapter was concerned with the statement of the basic problem which is the subject of this thesis. The nature of future warfare was briefly discussed and an analysis was made of the types of war in which the United States might become involved. Next, the essentials of a national security program were briefly outlined. One of these essentials, the need for an adequate armed forces and a trained reserve was outlined as being the problem with which this thesis was concerned.

The second chapter made an analysis of the problem of an adequate armed force. The problem was discussed generally, and an analysis was made of the military personnel needs of the immediate future. The present status of the armed forces was presented and the future proposed level of the armed forces was indicated. The needs of the armed forces to meet the

proposed future level were then determined and the military manpower pool was analyzed in detail. Proposals were then advanced for the utilization of this manpower pool in meeting the needs of the armed forces.

Chapter three was concerned with the historical background of universal military service. A survey was made of compulsory military service as it operated in the past in several European countries and a brief survey was made of the many attempts to establish such a program in the United States. Finally, a brief analysis was given of the systems of compulsory military training in use in two foreign countries today.

The fourth chapter proposed a program for universal military service to be established in this country. This chapter advanced certain fundamental principles which must be followed if such a program is to be successful. The general structure of the program and its control, direction, and organization were outlined. The basic training was discussed from the standpoint of age, length and scheduling of service, character and content of training, and from many other characteristics of the program. Training for those not physically qualified for military service was briefly discussed as was service in reserve activities upon completion of the period of training and service.

Chapter five was concerned with a discussion of the program outlined in the previous chapter. The program was analyzed to determine if it would provide the personnel necessary, and if

it were the most satisfactory of possible alternate solutions. The program was then analyzed to determine the various military and economic benefits which it would produce. Finally, the legal and political aspects of the program were considered to determine if such a program could be established and if it would have public backing.

The sixth and final chapter is concerned with a brief summarization of the thesis, a restatement of the recommendations made during the course of the thesis, and finally, a statement of the conclusions reached by the thesis.

II. [illegible]

Recommendations as made in this thesis were in two primary fields. First, recommendations made to build up the armed forces to the level proposed by the Department of Defense, and second, recommendations made to maintain them at that level.

To build up the armed forces to the proposed level, the following recommendations were made:

A. The utilization of all physically qualified men in the I-A classification of the Selective Service Pool of men between the ages of nineteen and twenty-six.

B. The reclassification of approximately 200,000 men now classified II-S in the Selective Service Pool between the ages of nineteen and twenty-six, such reclassification to occur at the end of the present school year.

C. The induction in the near future of the physically

qualified men in the eighteen to nineteen year old age group.

These three recommendations would provide the necessary men to build up the armed forces to the desired level. The following recommendations are made for the purpose of maintaining them at that level:

A. The establishment of a program of universal military service with the following features:

1. The requirement of universal service by every youth who is physically able to prepare for any form of useful service to his country.

2. The requirement of two years service to be broken down into a six months training period, and an eighteen months period of service in one of the armed forces.

3. The obligation for service to attach to the individual upon his eighteenth birthday.

4. The basic training period to include training in military subjects and in citizenship.

5. The giving of training of a non-military nature for those who are either physically unfit or conscientious objectors.

6. The offering of various options such as the opportunity to enlist in one of the regular services, to enter one of the service academies, or to enroll in one of the reserve officers training programs at a civilian educational institution after completion of the basic training period, such options to be exercised in lieu of the requirement of eighteen

months service after completion of the basic training.

7. The obligation of serving either three years in an organized reserve unit or five years in an unorganized reserve unit upon completion of the period of training and service.

The recommendations listed above would produce a universal military service program which would provide the men necessary to maintain the armed forces at the proposed level.

III. CONCLUSIONS

The United States' historic policy of military weakness between wars and the military improvisation necessary to fight them once they occur has been dangerous and costly in terms of American lives and wealth. A reversion to that policy would in the future risk disaster, a risk which we have faced twice in the last thirty-five years. Unfortunately, the tendency of human beings, whose way of life has been disturbed in time of war, is to return to the habits of life which they have known. We have fully experimented with unpreparedness as a means of avoiding war. It has not prevented war, to the contrary, it has led to staggering costs in terms of lives and money. If, as history shows, wars recur, we owe it to our youth to prepare them for service in future wars, a preparation which would give them a better chance of survival.

The program of universal military service as outlined in this thesis would give the youth of this country and the country itself a better chance of survival in the event of another

world war. The program as proposed would result in nine specific benefits to the country and would greatly assist the United States in approaching the desired national security.

The first of these benefits which this program of universal military service provides would be the training in the essentials of soldiering. It would enable the youth of the nation to make the substantial psychological adjustment to service life. It would familiarize them with the handling of military weapons, and would teach them to think like soldiers in military organizations and to develop habits of responses which save lives in time of war. It would impart to each trainee the psychological understanding that he has a duty to perform to his country as part of his obligation as a citizen. It would offer an opportunity for unit training and the selection of those youths who display leadership characteristics.

A second benefit of the program would be that it would make possible an effective National Guard and Organized Army, Navy, Air, and Marine Reserve Corps of the dimensions deemed necessary to permit rapid expansion of our professional establishment in time of war. A steady flow of young men thoroughly grounded in the fundamentals of soldiering directed into the reserve activities would give them a state of readiness that could never be obtained through voluntary means.

Third, a program of this nature would improve the alertness, efficiency, and quality of the regular forces in peace-

time and would encourage more young men to make a career in one of the regular services. Adoption of such a program would give the armed forces a concrete, constructive, and challenging job to do. It would make them continously responsible to an interested, concerned, and critical public, with beneficial to both groups. The services, subject to a degree of public scrutiny unprecedented in peacetime, would be under unrelaxing pressure to demonstrate that they were not slumbering in their thinking about theories of warfare and training or in the execution of military policies. On its side, the public would have a more immediate stake in our defense plans and in seeing that they were adequate and soundly conceived.

Fourth, a universal military service program would produce qualified reserve officers in numbers that would assist in meeting the officer requirements of the regular services and the reserve components. In addition, such a program would help to provide a pool of officers to staff the forces needed after mobilization in a future emergency. The caliber of our military force depends in large measure on officers who choose the service because they feel it offers the best opportunity for usefulness to the nation.

Fifth, this program would establish a continously replenished pool of young, physically fit, and trained reserves who could be mobilized in a future crisis. The program would not make available men who could be employed without further training

or who would possess specialized or technical skills. However, these men who, within the previous five years, had received basic training, could be given further training in a sufficiently short time to allow the mobilization within a year after M-Day of combined forces totaling between 7,500,000 and 8,500,000 men. The reduction in training time would speed up the pace of our offensive against the enemy, reduce the probable total casualties, and shorten the war.

Sixth, the program would provide a large, trained group in every community, capable of withstanding and dealing with the problems of civilian defense and mass disaster that severe bombing attacks might bring. Whether civilian defense becomes primarily the function of the National Guard in the first phases of a war, or whether it is to be made a community responsibility, its dimensions will be too great to handle without trained men. The organization of these men should be handled by an appropriate civilian defense agency.

Seventh, the program would involve the maintenance of an appropriate selective service system adaptable to rapid conversion to wartime needs. It would make possible a continous inventory of military skills, aptitudes, and leadership qualities, which could be used advantageously in making military assignments in wartime. The inventory would be especially helpful if a check were maintained on the whereabouts, subsequent training, skills, occupation, and dependency status of

those who complete their basic training and service. A selective service machinery, actively functioning in peacetime, would be a decided asset in wartime.

Eighth, universal military service would help channel talented young men into programs of scientific and vocational training in fields important to national defense. During the basic training period, it should be entirely possible to do enough along the lines of vocational testing to indicate the men with outstanding aptitudes. These aptitudes could be used in vocational counseling of the trainee for guidance into civilian pursuits upon completion of his training and service.

Finally, universal military service, by bringing together young men from all parts of the country to share a common experience and to fulfill a common obligation to their country, should contribute to the development of national unity -- the bedrock of our security. In an intelligently operated program, the universality of obligation reflected in universal military service would be of lasting benefit not only in preparing our democracy to stand off any threat from without but in making its meaning more real to its citizens.

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
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